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JUST VIOLENCE
Alice Ristroph*

Ethical reflections on war-and the positive laws these reflections have inspired
have framed their undertaking as the effort to limit and regulate state violence.
Ethical reflections on punishment have not been framed in the same way, but they
should be. Three characteristics of the philosophy (and laws) of war prove
especially instructivefor the philosophy (and laws) of punishment. First, the ethics
of war is an ethics of violence: it acknowledges and addresses the gritty and often
brutal realities of actual armed conflict. Punishment theory too often denies the
violence of punishment or otherwise neglects the realities of penal practices.
Second, philosophers of war tend to keep the usual agent of war's violence-the
state-squarely in view, whereas punishment theory tends to focus on the target of
punishment rather than its agent. Third, and most importantly, commentators on the
ethics of war have come to realize that the humanitarianproject of limiting violence
is a different and more difficult task than the project of justifying violence. This
insight has produced the jus in bello: a set of principles aimed at limiting the
violence of war without adopting a view of the war's justification. Punishment
theory has long been focused on the project ofjustifying punishment,but this Article
sketches the contours of a jus in poena: philosophicaland legalprinciples designed
to regulate the conduct of punishment without adopting any particulartheoretical
justificationfor punishment.
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CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTION
War and punishment are two of the state's most expansive and expensive
enterprises. They are different enterprises, of course, but they share some obvious
and striking similarities. They are the two situations in which the state most often
and most visibly uses physical force to injure, constrain, or even kill persons. In both
contexts, force is adopted as a policy choice and then implemented by trained and
authorized specialists. In both contexts, force is likely to be overused-often, the
policymakers and the specialists on the ground each have separate incentives to do
more violence rather than less.' And of course, in both contexts the appropriate kind
and degree of force is a matter of continuing debate.
The two activities are occasionally joined rhetorically, as in the familiar
discourse of the "War on Crime," but one should distinguish between rhetoric and
meaningful intellectual reflection. 2 The philosophies of war and punishment are
each independently well established: humans have been debating the ethics of war
and punishment for about as long as they have been waging war and punishing
wrongdoers. But these two fields of ethical inquiry have had limited, and mostly
one-directional, influence on one another. Certain concepts and institutions of
domestic criminal law have been adapted and applied to military conflicts for
decades if not centuries3 -hence war crimes, international criminal tribunals, and
other efforts to regulate war through criminal law4 -but the reverse is not true.

1.
2.

See infra Part I.
By some accounts, the "War on Crime" was first declared in 1968, when

Lyndon Johnson used the phrase in his State of the Union address, and in promoting the Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act. See, e.g., JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: How
THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF
FEAR 90-101 (2007); see also James Vorenberg, The War on Crime: The First Five Years,
ATLANTIC, May 1972, at 63. But see V.F. Nourse, Rethinking Crime Legislation: History and
Harshness,39 TULSA L. REV. 925, 928-29 (2004) (detailing several examples of war on crime
rhetoric by Herbert Hoover, Franklin Roosevelt, and members of the Roosevelt
administration in the 1920s and 1930s).
3.
The idea that some conduct is impermissible in war, and could constitute an
"offense against the law of nations," is an ancient concept. The specific terminology of "war
crimes" came into common usage with the Nuremburg Tribunals after World War II. Thus,
coincidentally, "war crimes" may have entered the English lexicon in roughly the same time
frame as "the war on crime." But while the former phrase takes seriously the concepts of both
war and crime, the latter has prompted little reflection of what it means to approach crime as
if we were fighting a war. See infra Part I.B.
4.
Of course, domestic criminal law has to be adapted-and its substantive
prohibitions modified-in order to serve as a framework to regulate war. See Samuel
Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Targeted Warfare: Individuating Enemy Responsibility, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1545 (2013) ("[W]ar turns on killing and capture-the heart of the
prohibitions of ordinary criminal law. The attempt to impose a legal regime on the conduct
of warfare required a disciplinary convention apart from the ordinary criminal code .... ).
But the point is that scholars of war take up this intellectual inquiry. See, e.g., Gabriella Blum,
The Laws of War and the "Lesser Evil," 35 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 31-38 (2010) [hereinafter
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Scholars and practitioners of domestic criminal law have, to date, given little
consideration to the ways their enterprise might be illuminated by the theories and
laws of war. Critics of War on Crime rhetoric have rejected military analogies,
fearful that such analogies simply foster a harsher, ever more severe criminal-justice
system.5 These critics have not asked whether the War on Crime is a just war, or
more broadly, whether the conceptual frameworks with which we evaluate military
force might actually inform and improve our evaluations of punitive force.
This Article takes up that inquiry. It argues that the philosophy of war is an
untapped but valuable resource for the field of criminal justice. For centuries, ethical
reflections on war-and the positive laws these reflections have inspired-have
framed their undertaking as the effort to limit and regulate state violence. The
philosophy and laws of punishment6 have not yet been framed in the same way, but
this Article argues that they should be. With respect to both war and punishment,
my focus here is more on philosophical frameworks than on positive laws. In each
field, however, philosophical arguments are not totally dissociated from legal ones,
so we have occasion to consider their interaction.
Three characteristics of the philosophy (and law) of war prove especially
instructive for the philosophy (and law) of punishment. First, the ethics of war is,
quite self-consciously, an ethics of violence. Philosophers of war do not deny war's
violence, and they have engaged, rather than ignored, the gritty realities of armed
conflict. Even commentators thoroughly and comfortably ensconced in the ivory
tower (or in the church, where much reflection on war has taken place) have sought
to understand and evaluate war as it exists in the real world. Accordingly,
philosophers of war tend to engage with facts. They are likely to address actual
historical examples, and they are likely to try to figure out the ethical implications
of empirical data of various kinds, be it the number of civilian casualties, or the
psychology of soldiers and officers, or the impact of new kinds of weapons. This is
true even of work by moral philosophers, thinkers who are not themselves empirical
researchers.
Second, philosophers of war keep the state squarely in view. Very often,
the state is the agent of war's violence. To be sure, the broad category of war may
be understood to include insurrections, civil wars, and other conflicts that involve
nonstate actors as agents of violence. Nevertheless, a great deal of warfare is
violence waged by states, so theories of war must-and do-address issues
regarding the nature of the state: the bounds of state sovereignty, for example, or the
appropriate allocation of responsibility among the state itself and the individual

Blum, Lesser Evil] (considering ways in which the necessity defense of domestic criminal
law might inform a humanitarian necessity principle in international law).
5.
See, e.g., Perry L. Moriearty & William Carson, Cognitive Warfare and Young
Black Males in America, 15 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 281 (2012). See infra Part JJ.C (for

further discussion of objections to war analogies in the criminal justice context).
6.
Punishment is not the only non-military context in which the state uses
violence, and it is not the only context in which ethicists and jurists might learn something
from the ethics and law of war. Although this Article focuses primarily on punishment, many
of its arguments apply to efforts to discipline other types of state violence such as police force,
formally civil detention, and coercive interrogation or torture.
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persons who act on its behalf. Regulating the state is, in many ways, a different and
more difficult task than regulating private individuals or entities.7
Third, in focusing on the realities of war, and in considering the state as an
agent of war, commentators on the ethics of war have come to recognize that the
humanitarian project of limiting violence is a different and more difficult task than
justifying it. Early Christian writings on war focused on questions of justification:
they tackled the question whether a good Christian could serve as a soldier, and
concluded that one could, so long as the war was a just war.' From these writings,
and others, developed the notion of the jus ad bellum-the justice of war-and
specific principles purporting to distinguish justified wars from unjustified ones. 9
Around the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century, however, commentators
became increasingly dissatisfied with the jus ad bellum as a mechanism to limit the
violence of war.' 0 They observed that setting forth the conditions of just war simply
led belligerents to frame their actions in those terms. Put simply, everyone who went
to war claimed, usually in good faith, to be justified in doing so. Accordingly, many
commentators began to emphasize the limitation of war rather than its justification.
This led to the development of a separate set of principles known today as the jus in
bello-the justice in war, rather than the justice of war. The principles of the jus in
bello seek to regulate the conduct of war; they ask how war is fought, not whether
it is justified. Laws motivated by the jus in bello address, for example, the type of
weapons that may be used, or the treatment of prisoners of war, or the ever-present
problem of foreseeable harm to noncombatant civilians. The jus in bello is explicit
in its aim to limit the violence of war by restricting the modes of permissible warfare,
whether the war is just or unjust.
For each of these characteristics of the philosophy of war-its recognition
of the violence and empirical realities of war, its recognition of the importance of
the state, and its focus on limitation rather than justification-one can draw a sharp
contrast with philosophical work on punishment. Punishment theory does not
typically identify punishment as an act of violence; indeed, punishment theory says
surprisingly little about types of sanctions and the degree of physical coercion or
injury they involve." Moreover, philosophies of punishment tend to assume that the
state will be the agent of punishment, but beyond that they usually say little about
the state. Especially in retributive theory, which has dominated punishment theory

7.
See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International
Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REv. 1791, 1792-93 (2009); Alice
Ristroph, Covenants for the Sword, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 657, 659-63 (2011); Nicholas
Rosencranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1209, 1210-12 (2010).
See infra Part II.A.
8.
9.
As discussed in Part II, the specific phrases jus ad bellum andjus in bello came
into use only after World War II. I use the phrases, albeit somewhat anachronistically, to refer
to the centuries-older principles of just war and limited war that are today commonly
associated with these Latin terms.
10.
See infra Part II.A.
11.
Capital punishment is an exception. Many commentators have addressed the
death penalty in detail; many condemn its violence. But the tremendous attention given to
death sentences makes the relative scholarly indifference to the realities of incarceration all
the more notable. See infra Part I.B.
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for a few decades now, the philosopher's focus tends to be on the target of
punishment-the criminal-rather than on the agent of punishment. Retributive
theorists tend to work in the passive voice-their question is why the criminal
deserves to be punished rather than why the state has the power or authority to
punish him. Finally, both retributive and nonretributive punishment theories have
focused overwhelmingly on the question of moral justification. "Why (or how) is
punishment justified," is the question on which each new philosopher of criminal
law must cut his teeth, it seems, and a question that occupies many philosophers
throughout their careers.1 2 These scholars see the project of limiting punishment as
derivative of the project of justification; according to this view, the way to limit
punishment is to reaffirm its justification and ensure that we punish only when
justified. Punishment theory, one could say, remains firmly fixated on the jus ad
poena.13

This Article seeks to inspire ajus in poena, a set of philosophical and legal
principles designed to regulate the conduct of punishment. Such an approach would
identify limiting principles that are independent of theoretical justifications of
punishment.' 4 It would, for example, lead to a very different interpretive approach
to the Eighth Amendment. Current doctrinal standards assess whether a punishment
is so disproportionate that it is "cruel and unusual" (and thus, unconstitutional) by
asking whether the punishment is unjustified. " Constitutional limitations on
punishment are thus derivative of theories of justification, and as in the war context,
this approach has imposed few meaningful restrictions on the use of force. If we
understood the Eighth Amendment as an independent limiting principle, rather than
as a rule whose scope is no broader than the small and shrinking space between
asserted justifications of punishment, it could serve to discipline the use of punitive
12.
Theoretically inclined criminal law scholars often tackle the justification of
punishment in their maiden (or near-maiden) publications, usually adopting one variant or
another of retributivism. See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal
Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 307 (2004); Chad Flanders, Retribution and Reform, 70
MD. L. REv. 87 (2010); David Gray, Punishmentas Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REv. 1619 (2010);
Adil Ahmad Haque, Group Violence and Group Vengeance: Toward a Retributivist Theory
of InternationalCriminalLaw, 9 BUFF. CRI. L. REv. 273 (2005); Dan Markel, The Justice
of Amnesty? Towards a Theory of Retributivism in Recovering States, 49 U. TORONTO L.J.
389 (1999). For further discussion of works by career retributivists, see infra Part II.B.
13.
Jus adpoena andjus in poena are not widely used terms, but they have have
been used by at least two other scholars. See DONALD X. BURT, FRIENDSHIP AND SOCIETY: AN
INTRODUCTION TO AUGUSTINE'S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 186 (1999); David Estlund, On
Following Orders in an Unjust War, 15 J. POL. PHIL. 213, 229 (2007). Both Burt and Estlund
use the terms to capture the distinction between the overall justification of punishment and
the permissibility of a particular method (or amount) of punishment.
14.
Thus, the argument here is not an effort to ensure that the War on Crime is a
just war. As discussed in Part IIA, in philosophies of war we find a great deal of
disillusionment with the idea of a just war. To identify the conditions for just violence, as
does just war theory, fails to limit acts of violence and may even increase them. The ethics of
war has largely moved beyond the project of justification, and I will suggest that the ethics of
criminal justice should do the same.
15.
See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010) ("A sentence lacking any
legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense."); see also
Youngjae Lee, The Purposes of Punishment Test, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 58, 58 (2010).
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force far more effectively. This Article develops this and other implications of ajus
in poena.
More broadly, this Article encourages greater recognition of the
continuities across different types of state violence, with the hope that lessons
learned in one context may prove useful in another. 16 The project is candidly
ambitious and in some senses radical, for it would reorient a well-established
philosophical field. But that philosophical field is showing signs of stagnation, and
indeed, of irrelevance. 17 Reorientation toward a jus in poena will bring new
intellectual energy into punishment philosophy, and it should make punishment
philosophy more relevant to the practice of punishment.
Part I makes a preliminary case for why it might be helpful to think about
war and criminal justice alongside one another. Part II looks in more detail at the
philosophy of war and its efforts to discipline the violence of war, focusing in
particular on the transition from jus ad bellum to jus in bello. This Part also draws
some contrasts to philosophical work on punishment, and considers objections to,
and the limits of, the war-punishment analogy. Finally, Part III offers a few specific
examples of how the ethics of criminal justice might be different if inspired by the
ethics of war.

I. WAR AND PUNISHMENT AS STATE VIOLENCE
To some readers, the shared characteristics of war and punishment will be
obvious. To others, what distinguishes the two activities will seem more important
than what they have in common. Readers in either camp, but especially those in the
latter, may resist the classification of punishment as violence. This Part explains
why it is useful to think of war and punishment as variants of state violence-and
why we should pay greater heed to the continuities across different kinds of state
violence. Indeed, though this Article focuses on war and punishment, many of its
arguments apply to police force, ostensibly nonpunitive detention, and physically
coercive interrogation techniques. Without equating these various types of state
violence, we can identify some important consistencies and similarities.
At the outset, it is worthwhile to say a little bit about the word "violence."
It is a word often and easily associated with war, but its use is more controversial
with respect to the legitimate activities of criminal justice professionals. Obviously,
16.
Cf STATES OF VIOLENCE: WAR, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AND LETTING DIE
(Austin Sarat & Jennifer L. Culbert eds., 2009); Jonathan Hafetz, Detention Without End?:
Reexaming the Indefinite Confinement of Terrorism Suspects through the Lens of Criminal

Sentencing, 61 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 326, 332-33 (2014); Judith Resnik, Detention, The War on
Terror,and the FederalCourts:An Essay in Honor ofHenry Monaghan, 110 COLUM. L. REv.

579, 584-90 (2010) (arguing for an "integrated approach" in which the law of detention is
studied across several contexts: counterterrorism, immigration, policing, and prisons).
17.
What I call stagnation, more generous commentators call consensus. See, e.g.,
Michael T. Cahill, PunishmentPluralism,in RETRBUTIVISM: ESSAYS ON THEORY AND POLICY
25, 43 n.5 (Mark D. White ed., 2011). More impatient commentators are just bored. See Paul
H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as Controlling
Crime, 42 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1089, 1089 (2010-2011) ("How can we justify having a system that
imposes punishment? The moral philosophers have killed many forests answering this
question but, to be honest, I've always found it a bit boring.").
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punishment-like policing, and like war-involves a wide, diverse array of
activities and strategies. Not all of those activities are violent. Some of them are, in
the sense that the essential tactic is to use superior physical force to overcome a
physically vulnerable human being.
Force, too, can be a contested term. The phrase "use of force" is a term of
art both among criminal justice professionals and in the laws of war-one not
defined consistently, but often defined more narrowly than common understandings
of the word violence." In the criminal justice context, a typical definition would
restrict the term "use of force" to the use of weapons, canines, or "significant
physical contact."' 9 Such a definition conceives the use of force along the lines of
hand-to-hand combat; it would exclude physical confinement that is effected
without direct, continuous bodily contact. 20 It is not difficult to see why criminal
justice professionals would prefer narrow definitions of the concept of force. Certain
state activities are subject to specific constitutional regulation-seizures (of which
uses of force are a subset) as well as searches and punishment-and, thus, public
officials have sought to define each of these terms narrowly to minimize the

18.
See John J. Gibbons & Nicholas De B. Katzenbach, Confronting Confinement:
A Report of the Commission on Safety and Abuse in America's Prisons, 22 WASH. U. J. L. &
POL'Y 385, 418, 421 (2006) (noting the lack of uniform definitions for nonlethal force in U.S.
prisons and calling for uniform definitions). The laws of war also rely on the phrase "use of
force," usually without precise definitions, to refer generally to the deployment of weapons,
some troop movements, and many of the initial acts that are seen to initiate military conflict.
See David Weissbrodt, Cyber-Conflict, Cyber-Crime, and Cyber-Espionage, 22 MINN. J.
INT'L L. 347, 357-59 (2013) (noting the lack of a clear definition of "use of force" in
international law, and detailing some acts that have been included, such as armed attacks,
training and arming rebel forces, or excluded, such as economic and political coercion, from
the category).
19.
For example, Rachel Harmon quotes a federal consent order for the following
"reasonable definition" of the term "use of force":
[A]ny physical strike or instrumental contact with a person; any
intentional attempted physical strike or instrumental contact that does not
take effect, or any significant physical contact that restricts the movement
of a person. The term includes the discharge of firearms; the use of
chemical spray, choke holds, or hard hands; the taking of a subject to the
ground; or the deployment of a canine. The term does not include
escorting or handcuffing a person, with no or minimal resistance.
Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1119, 1125 n.14
(2008) (quoting Consent Judgment: Conditions of Confinement at 1-2, United States v. City
of Detroit, No. 03-72258, 2014 WL 4384481 (E.D. Mich. July 18, 2003)).
20.
The definition quoted in note 19 specifically excludes the use of handcuffs if
the person restrained offers "no or minimal resistance." This caveat constitutes a "resistance
requirement" akin to the resistance requirement that once characterized the legal definition of
rape. Under that resistance requirement, many courts found that if the victim did not fight
back, a sexual encounter could not have been rape. See generally Michelle J. Anderson,
Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 953 (1998). Here the implication is

that if a prisoner does not fight back, custody-even with physical restraints-cannot
constitute a use of force. But see Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 99 (2005) (referring to "[t]he

officers' use of force in the form of handcuffs"); see also id. at 103 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("The use of handcuffs is the use of force .... ).
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constitutional constraints on the criminal justice system. 21 Given the narrow
doctrinal definitions, it is important to emphasize that physical force characterizes
the business of criminal justice to a much greater extent than the legal term of art
"use of force" suggests. Even if a police officer does not use a billy club or fire a
gun, ordinary arrests are predicated on a fairly direct threat of superior physical
force, and ordinary police custody is simple physical confinement. Similarly, even
if a corrections officer does not rough up a prisoner, an ordinary prison sentence is
characterized by the exercise of superior physical power. The point is that the
exercise of physical force is not exceptional in the criminal justice context; rather, it
is part and parcel of many run-of-the-mill criminal justice activities.
Violence, as understood here and in ordinary speech, is a concern of human
beings because they are physically embodied, vulnerable, and mortal creatures. This
understanding will not prove especially controversial once stated clearly, I hope, but
it is not often stated clearly. Western political thought has long pondered and
celebrated the mental faculties of the human species-our capacities for reason,
discourse, deliberation, and volition. 2 2 In other words, thinkers have prioritized the
capacity for thinking. This focus on the cerebral has occasionally obscured or
deemphasized the corporeal dimensions of human existence. 23 Philosophers and
theologians alike have said much about what separates man from beasts, and we
forget sometimes that the human person is an animal too, in need of nourishment
and shelter, susceptible to pain and injury, and inevitably mortal. Violence takes
advantage of the human body's physical limitations; in various forms, violence may
restrain, immobilize, maim, or kill. That is the conception of violence that best
explains most common sense understandings of "violent crime," though in formal
law that term, too, is inconsistently defined and strategically redefined. 2 4 H.L.A.
Hart once argued that if "men were to become invulnerable to attack by each other,
were clad perhaps like giant land crabs with an impenetrable carapace," then "rules
forbidding the free use of violence" would no longer be necessary. 25 Importantly,
the criminal justice system relies on human embodiment and humans' physical
vulnerability to achieve its basic goals. Prisons constrain us because we cannot beam
ourselves out of them; the police officer has authority because we are vulnerable to

21.
See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-09 (2005) (holding that a
canine sniff generally is not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment);
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843-44 (1998) (holding that a police chase
that ended with a fatal car crash was not a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299-301 (1991) (holding that prison conditions
not traceable to an official's culpable state of mind are not "punishment" within the meaning
of the Eighth Amendment).
22.
See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. I (C.D.C. Reeve trans., Hackett Publ'g Co.
1998) (c. 384 B.C.E.); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 10 (C.B. Macpherson
ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980) (1690).
23.
Feminist thinkers have drawn particular attention to this phenomenon. See,
e.g., ELIZABETH GROSZ, VOLATILE BODIES: TOWARD A CORPOREAL FEMINISM (1994); DONNA
HARAWAY, SIMIANS, CYBORGS, AND WOMEN: THE REINVENTION OF NATURE (1991).
24.
See Alice Ristroph, CriminalLaw in the Shadow of Violence, 62 ALA.

L. REv.
571, 602-10 (2011).
25.
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L.
REv. 593, 623 (1958).
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the force he is authorized to use. Were humans as invulnerable as Hart imagined,
substantive criminal law and the practices of policing and punishment would look
very different.
To be sure, violence is a charged word, and its usage here may provoke
resistance from persons who want to defend the basic legitimacy of criminal law and
punishment. But just as we can recognize that war is violent without adopting a
position of strict pacifism or condemning the integrity of soldiers, we can
acknowledge the considerable role that violence plays in our criminal justice system
without seeking to abolish punishment and without casting aspersions on criminal
justice professionals. The philosopher C.A.J. Coady has used the term "legitimist"
to describe those conceptions of violence that view it as necessarily illegitimate. 26
Legitimist conceptions ("illegitimist" might be a better descriptor) have not gained
much traction in the philosophy of war, where the recognition of violence precedes
the normative evaluation of it. Even in domestic affairs, we see a similar rejection
of the view that violence is necessarily illegitimate in Max Weber's oft-quoted
definition of the state as an entity with a monopoly of legitimate violence in a given
territory. 27 In short, to call actions violent is not necessarily to condemn them.
And there are good reasons to use the word. To identify certain government
activities as "state violence" helps us to notice several shared characteristics of those
activities, and it may help focus our ethical attention, so to speak. First, the simple
fact that the state is pursuing its ends through the use of superior force raises
concerns in our political system-one in which government power is presumably
based on deliberative consensus, on actual or tacit or hypothesized consent, on
agreement rather than armament. We imagine our society as one in which "right" is
not defined solely in terms of "might." As noted above, this self-conception
generates some ideological discomfort with the word violence, but such ideological
discomfort is itself a reason to use the word violence. Rather than take for granted
the legitimacy of the state's uses of force, we should continually articulate, examine,
and evaluate the purported distinctions between the state's violence and the violence
we condemn.
In addition, several other attributes are common to various types of state
violence and relevant to our ethical and legal assessments. Consider the importance,
or purported importance, of expertise. It is often said that decisions about using force
require special knowledge, experience, and expertise.28 In war and other armed
conflicts, the selection of military targets, the choice of weapons, and other questions
of military strategy are the province of experts. In the criminal justice system, the
decision to handcuff a suspect, or the choice to use deadly force, is similarly viewed
as a matter for a professional's expert judgment. According to one extensive

26.
C.A.J. COADY, MORALITY AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 23 (2008) ("The third
type of definition-that called 'legitimist'
incorporates a reference to an illegal or
illegitimate use of force.").
27.
Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGY

28.

78 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 2001).

See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE 11-12 (1958);
ERIC POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE
COURTS 29-31 (2007).
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empirical study, the presence of trained and competent "violence specialists" is
critical to the success of stable democratic societies. 29 Of course, specialists and
experts are prevalent throughout government bureaucracy, but calls for deference to
executive expertise are especially pronounced with respect to state violence. 3 0
Relatedly, consider the importance of discretion. Often, experts' decisions
to use force involve fact-specific, highly contextual judgments, and thus there is a
perceived need for discretion on the ground. Discretion has long been protected in
the military context, but it has been vigorously reaffirmed and expanded in post9/11 national security policy. 31 We often see a similar emphasis on the need for
discretion in discussions of police officers' and prison officials' decisions. 32
Arguably, we can cabin the judgments of violence specialists only so much, and we
have to leave the final decisions to those with boots on the ground.
Some decisions about the use of force are made at a higher level, not on the
ground in the moment, but by military brass, executive officials, or legislatures.
Think, for example, of the choice to use drone strikes abroad, or, in the domestic
context, the choice to punish a given type of offense with prison time rather than a
noncustodial sentence. These decisions may sometimes require special expertise,
but even when they do not, they involve highly contentious moral and political
judgments. Controversial judgment calls, like expertise, are hardly unique to state
violence, but violence policy stirs passions and protests with particular intensity.
Importantly, those with the authority to choose violence-whether as policy or as a
strategic, on-the-ground choice in a given encounter-have incentives to err on the
side of more violence rather than less. The most immediate and direct costs of excess
violence are usually borne by the politically powerless: civilians or soldiers of a
foreign nation, or convicted criminals at home. 3 3 To use too little violence-or to be

29.
DOUGLASS C. NORTH ET AL., VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL ORDERS: A CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING RECORDED HUMAN HISTORY 17-20 (2009).
30.
See Kathryn E. Kovacs, Leveling the Deference Playing Field,90 OR. L. REv.
583, 591-610 (2011) (detailing and critiquing the "super-deference" given by courts to the
military); Deborah N. Pearlstein, The Soldier, the State, and the Separation of Powers, 90

TEX. L. REv. 797, 799-801 (2012) (suggesting that, counter to models of civilian control of
the military, military expertise sometimes constrains civilian political judgments).
31.
See, e.g., Aziz Rana, Who Decides on Security?, 44 CONN. L. REv. 1417,
1480-83 (2012).
32.
See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis
of CriminalProcedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1154 (1998) (calling for the development of new
doctrinal rules that recognize "the legitimate function of discretionary policing techniques");
Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts,
Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 551, 652 (1997) ("[T]he
accountability of police both to the communities they serve and to the rule of law is best
assured by recognizing explicitly the inevitability-and even, properly managed, the
desirability-of police discretion."); see generally DISCRETION, COMMUNITY, AND
CORRECTIONAL ETHICS (John Kleinig & Margaret Leland Smith eds., 2001) (discussing prison
administrators' discretion).

33.

As Bill Stuntz observed and as many other criminal law scholars have

reiterated, the politics of criminal justice in the United States creates a "one-way ratchet"
producing ever broader prohibitions and ever more severe sentences. William J. Stuntz, The
PathologicalPolitics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505, 509 (2001); see also Miriam
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perceived as having used too little violence-is, in American politics, often a fast
track to electoral defeat or other negative repercussions.3 4 Similarly, for the police
officer or the soldier on the ground, using more violence often means less personal
risk: shoot first and ask questions later.35
Given that decisions about use of force often require expertise, individual
discretion, and contentious moral judgments, there is considerable judicial aversion
to second-guess those decisions.3 6 In American courts, questions about the use of
state violence are often framed either as questions for experts in the executive
branch, or as political questions to be decided by legislatures-not as questions that
lend themselves well to judicial review. 37 Thus, there is a tension between the
legitimating discourses around the state's uses of force, which portray official force
as subject to the rule of law, and the actual legal standards applied to official force,
which tend to emphasize discretion and minimize the appropriate scope of judicial
review.
In the context of war, however, the fact that decisions about the use of force
involve expertise, discretion, and contentious moral and political choices has not
deterred the pursuit of legal constraints. Academics and practitioners alike have
plunged ahead, sensitive to the difficulties of regulating the state's use of violence,
but determined to find ways to address those difficulties. And with respect to war,
philosophers and ethicists have had considerable influence on positive law. Just how
much influence is a matter of dispute, and I do not wish to exaggerate the role of
philosophers. At the very minimum, it is clear that political leaders attempt to
H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REv. 577, 586-99 (2012) (arguing that it is

politically easier to punish than to regulate by nonpunitive measures).
34.
"[T]he ghost of Willie Horton haunts every public official." Jennifer Daskal,
Pre-Crime Restraints: The Explosion of Targeted, NoncustodialPrevention, 99 CORNELL L.
REv. 327, 368 (2014) (referring to a Massachusetts criminal who committed rape and assault
while released on a prison furlough program, and whose case was used to portray presidential

candidate and former governor Michael Dukakis as unduly soft on crime). One may point
also to Rose Bird, the former Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, ousted by voters
angered by her opposition to the death penalty. See Maura Dolan, Bird's Legacy More
PoliticalThan Legal, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1999, at Al.
35.
Cf MARK J. OSIEL, OBEYING ORDERS: ATROCITY, MILITARY DISCIPLINE, AND
THE LAW OF WAR 161-62 (1999) (discussing soldiers' behavior and incentives in the "frenzy
of combat").
36.
See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008) ("Unlike the
President and some designated Members of Congress, neither the Members of this Court nor
most federal judges begin the day with briefings that may describe new and serious threats to
our Nation and its people. The law must accord the Executive substantial authority to
apprehend and detain those who pose a real danger to our security."); Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 547-48 (1979) (endorsing a general approach of judicial deference to the judgments
of prison administrators). See also Robert M. Chesney, NationalSecurity Fact Deference, 95
VA. L. REv. 1361, 1380 (2009) (noting that courts are often "loath to question the judgment
of executive officials when push comes to shove").
37.
See, e.g., POSNER & VERMEULE, supranote 28; Kovacs, supranote 30. Outside
of the United States, courts are often less deferential to executive or legislative judgments
about the use of force, in part because other nations have adopted more robust proportionality
doctrines. See Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, ProportionalityBalancing and Global
Constitutionalism,47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 72, 113-19 (2008).
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explain and justify their military decisions in the language of just war.3 Even
beyond the rhetoric, though, there are meaningful restrictions on the conduct of war
that have grown out of work by philosophers and ethicists. The next Part explores
that work and its effects.

II. DISCIPLINING WAR, DEFENDING PUNISHMENT
Commentators have different views about how to evaluate and when to
condemn war's violence, but there is little disagreement over the proposition that
war is violent, and thus those who study the ethics of war study an ethics of violence.
At the extremes, war's violence could serve as a reason to condemn war in all
circumstances, or as an indication that ethical argument has no bearing on the
battlefield.39 Though some have voiced each of these views, a far more common
approach seeks to discipline war rather than to prohibit it altogether or leave it
unregulated. The concept of ethical violence is probably most easily identified in the
just war tradition, which sets forth conditions under which it is permissible or even
mandatory for humans to kill, injure, and confine one another.4 0 But the pursuit of
ethical standards for violence is not limited to those who study just war in particular.
A great deal of post-World War II commentary questions or even rejects the specific
concept of just war, but it is no less concerned-it may be even more concernedwith regulating and constraining war's violence, and making violence ethical.
Like just war theorists, philosophers of punishment set forth conditions for
permissible or mandatory killing, injury, and confinement. But punishment theorists
are unlikely to frame their work as an inquiry into the ethics of violence.
Incarceration-the prototypical punishment imagined or assumed by many
contemporary philosophers-is certainly less bloody and destructive than combat.
Perhaps as a result, punishment theorists have sought to defend punishment rather
than to discipline it. Tremendous intellectual energy has been spent developing
justifications for the institution of punishment.
This Part juxtaposes the philosophy of war with the philosophy of
punishment, and examines the interaction of each with positive law and actual state

38.
For example, President Obama has repeatedly framed his decisions as
Commander in Chief in the language of just war. Whether the decisions actually satisfy the
requirements of just war theory is contested. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE VIOLENCE OF
PEACE: AMERICA'S WARS IN THE AGE OF OBAMA 22 (2011).
39.
The radical pacifist position is that war is never ethically permissible. See, e.g.,
STANLEY HAUERWAS, WAR AND THE AMERICAN DIFFERENCE (2011). The most stringent
realist (or sometimes, realpolitik) view is that war necessarily takes place in a sphere outside
of ethics and morality. It is a testament to the success of the just war tradition that among
contemporary commentators, the strong realist view is much more often described and
critiqued than it is directly advanced. See, e.g., JONATHAN HASLAM, No VIRTUE LIKE
NECESSITY: REALIST THOUGHT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SINCE MACHIAVELLI 183-247
(2002); RICHARD NED LEBOW, THE TRAGIC VISION OF POLITICS: ETHICS, INTERESTS AND

15 (2003).
40.
See Jens David Ohlin, Targeting and the Concept of Intent, 35 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 79, 81 n.3 (2013) ("Just War Theory is the branch of ethics dealing with the permissibility
of the use of force, both in the decision to go to war (jus ad bellum) and in the conduct of war
ORDERS

(jus in bello).").
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practices. Three points of contrast are of particular interest: the extent to which each
field acknowledges and addresses the empirical realities of violence; the extent to
which each field focuses on the state as the agent of violence; and the relative
emphasis placed on justifying violence as opposed to limiting it. At the end of this
Part, the Article considers objections to the war-punishment analogy.

A. From Jus ad Bellum to Jus in Bello
"The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must." 41 From
one of the earliest written reflections on war-Thucydides's History of the
Peloponnesian Wars-comes this apparent rejection of any ethical restriction on
war. 4 2 And yet, the reality is more complex, and was so even in ancient Greece.
Notwithstanding the Athenian generals' assertion of raw power, Thucydides's
history is full of other examples in which the Greeks adopted rules for warfare, most
related to religious observance: priests and religious sites were immune from attack,
the bodies of the enemy dead were returned to the enemy for proper burial, and, once
every four years, any ongoing wars were temporarily suspended so that the Olympic
Games could take place in peace. 43
In the centuries-the millennia-that have passed since Thucydides's
writing; the enduring temptation of the Athenian generals' view has been countered
repeatedly with efforts to constrain the actions of the strong and limit the suffering
of the weak. (To be clear, the Athenian generals' view does and will remain a
temptation. Ethical restriction of war is an ongoing project, not a fait accompli.)
Among these efforts, the just war tradition offers some of the most sustained and
developed attempts to distinguish permissible from impermissible war. The specific
phrase "just war" is usually traced to early Christian thinkers who tackled the
question whether good Christians could engage in warfare, which of course involved
doing harm to the enemy and, quite often, killing people. Some of these thinkers,
most famously Augustine in the fourth and fifth centuries and Thomas Aquinas in
the thirteenth century, answered in the affirmative: a good Christian could serve as
a soldier, provided that he fought in a just war.44 A just war was one fought for a

41.
THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WARS 269 (Richard Crawley
trans., 2004) (1910).
42.
The context is the Melian dialogue, in which Athenian generals threatened to
destroy the residents of the island of Melos if they did not agree to be ruled by the Athenian
empire. The Melians protested, invoking claims of fairness and justice. The Athenian generals
were unmoved, and replied with their now infamous invocation of might over right. See id. at
268-72.

43.

See, e.g., id. at 253; see also Adrian Laani, The Laws of War in Ancient Greece,

26 L. & HIST. REv. 469, 470 (2006) (arguing that ancient Greek city-states observed various
legal restrictions on war).
44.
AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD AGAINST THE PAGANS, bk. I, at 39 (R.W. Dyson
ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (430); THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae, in
POLITICAL WRITINGS 240-47 (R.W. Dyson ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (1274).
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"just cause." 4 5 Self-defense counted as a just cause, as did the punishment of
wrongdoers, and the preservation of the Christian faith.46
These principles developed into what is now known as the jus ad bellum:
the justice of war, or the rules governing the resort to armed force. 4 7 Indeed,
sometimes the phrases "jus ad bellum" and "just war" are treated as interchangeable.
Jus ad bellum refers to the inquiry whether a nation is right to go to war in a given
situation. Just cause is one criterion-perhaps the most important-but this criterion
is interpreted much more narrowly today than it was in the past. Most contemporary
theorists agree that a nation may wage war only in self-defense or in the defense of
others; wars to promote religion or punish wrongdoers are no longer endorsed.4 8
Sometimes other requirements are included within the jus ad bellum, such as a
sufficient likelihood of success or a last resort condition.4 9 Importantly, the inquiry
is framed as one into the war's justification. The jus ad bellum offers a way to
evaluate whether a war is justified, all relevant things considered.
The ethics of war devoted much attention to just war for centuries. But a
separate, distinct inquiry appeared from time to time, even as early as Thucydides,
and then took greater and greater prominence beginning around the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. 0 This separate inquiry did not ask whether a country was
justified in entering into war, but whether the conduct of the war respected certain
limitations. Today, the set of principles that have developed in response to that
inquiry is known as thejus in bello, a term usually translated as the "justice in war.""
The distinction is worth emphasizing, for it will be especially instructive for the
issues of criminal justice that motivate this Article. Again, the jus ad bellum, or the
justice of war, focuses on the question of whether a state is right or justified to go to
war in a given instance. The jus in bello, or the justice in war, in contrast, focuses
on whether the war is fought in an ethically permissible way. It considers, among
other things, the kinds of weapons used, the selection of targets, the treatment of

45.
See AQUINAS, supra note 44.
46.
See, e.g., AUGUSTINE, POLITICAL WRITINGS 222-23 (Michael W. Tkacz &
Douglas Kries trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1994) (430).
47.
Although it is very common for scholars to trace the jus ad bellum to
Augustine's fifth century writings or even earlier works, the specific phrases jus ad bellum
andjus in bello were apparently coined only in the twentieth century. See Robert Kolb, Origin
of the Twin Terms Jus ad Bellum/Jus in Bello, 320 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 553, 553-54 (1997).
48.
See David Luban, War as Punishment, 39 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 299, 299 (2011)
[hereinafter Luban, War as Punishment]; Gregory M. Reichberg, Jus ad Bellum, in WAR:
ESSAYS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 21-29 (Larry May ed., 2008).

49.

See Thomas Hurka, Proportionality and Necessity, in WAR:

ESSAYS IN

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 127-44 (Larry May ed., 2008).

50.
See Nicholas Rengger, The Jus in Bello in Historical and Philosophical
Perspective, in WAR: ESSAYS INPOLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (Larry May ed., 2008).
51.
As with the jus ad bellum, many of the ideas now associated with the jus in
bello are much older than the specific Latin phrase, which came into regular use only after
World War II. See Kolb, supra note 47. But see JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE VERDICT OF BATTLE:
THE LAW OF VICTORY AND THE MAKING OF MODERN WAR 101-03 (2012) (questioning the
link between contemporary understandings of jus in bello and Medieval/Renaissance theories
of war).
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captured fighters, and the scale of the damage inflicted.52 The jus in bello is
explicitly concerned with minimizing the suffering generated by war, as suggested
by the term used to describe the legal rules associated with the jus in bello:
international humanitarian law.53
Three points regarding the relationship of the jus ad bellum and the jus in
bello bear emphasis. First, it is nearly axiomatic that the jus ad bellum and the jus in
bello are independent of one another.54 They operate autonomously. That means that
the rules of the jus in bello-the restrictions on the conduct of war-apply equally
to all participants in war, whether or not the war is just." A country that had just
cause to go to war may nonetheless be faulted for violations of the rules of the jus
in bello in the conduct of that originally justified war.5 6 A country that is wrong to
wage war in the first place is nonetheless both obligated and protected by the ethical
rules governing the conduct of war. 57 The aim of the jus in bello is to limit
violence-a project that is independent of the jus ad bellum's analysis of the
justification of violence.
Second, of the two sets of principles, the jus in bello is undoubtedly more
influential today. 8 To be sure, philosophers of war did not entirely abandon the jus
ad bellum once they began to focus more on the jus in bello. Some commentators
maintain that a war must comply with both ad bellum and in bello principles, both
as a matter of normative theory and as a matter of positive law.5 9 Nonetheless, there
is little dispute that greater attention is given to in bello principles, and that these
principles have been developed more extensively and incorporated into international

52.
See Rengger, supra note 50, at 41.
53.
"[T]he terms 'laws of war' and 'international humanitarian law' are widely
considered interchangeable in translating the original Latin term of jus in bello . . . ." Blum,
Lesser Evil, supra note 4, at 8.
54.
See, e.g., Jenny Martinez, Introductory Remarks, The Relationship Between
Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello: Past, Present,Future, 100 AM. Soc. INT'LL. PROC. 109, 109
(2006); Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum
and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 47, 49-50 (2009)
(noting the "axiomatic" independence of thejus ad bellum and the jus in bello).
55.
See, e.g., Adam Roberts, The Equal Application of the Laws of War: A
PrincipleUnder Pressure,90 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 931, 932 (2008).
56.
See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARs: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 21 (1977).
57.
Cf Jens David Ohlin, The Duty to Capture, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1286
(2013) (noting that even if the United States has violated the jus ad bellum principles in its
attacks on al Qaeda, principles of international humanitarian law or thejus in bello continue
to govern the conflict).
58.
"[W]hile the jus ad bellum withered on the bough, the jus in bello flourished
like the Green Bay Tree." GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945 20 (1994), quoted in
Rengger, supra note 50; Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, From Just War to False Peace, 13
CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 21 (2012) ("[T]he period of the Reformation and afterward saw a decided
turn away from jus ad bellum and towards the development, and eventual codification, of jus
in bello.").
59.
See Laurie R. Blank, A New Twist on an Old Story: Lawfare and the Mixing
of Proportionalities,43 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 707, 708 (2011).
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law more effectively. Indeed, phrases such as "the law of war," "international
humanitarian law," and the "jus in bello" are often used interchangeably. 60
Perhaps the greater influence of the jus in bello is unsurprising, given a
third important attribute of the relationship between ad bellum and in bello
principles: part of the impetus for the latter was the growing realization that the
former was ineffective and inadequate. Over the centuries, thanks in part to
technological advancements in weaponry, wars have exacted greater tolls on
humans. 6 1 Importantly, armed conflicts are no longer confined to "set-piece battles
on discrete battlefields," but now involve the use of force in contexts where civilians
are more likely to be harmed. 6 2 These changes have generated ever more pressure to
contain the violence of war. For a long time the effort to discipline wars was, as we
have seen, an inquiry into whether the war was just, or whether it was fought for a
just cause. But philosophers and others noticed that states often went to war with the
belief that their causes were just, or at least purported to do so. 63 It was not always
clear at the time of fighting, or at least, not always possible to establish, who was in
fact in the right. Even if it seemed obvious to third parties who was right and who
was wrong, the nations fighting one another typically each maintained that they
fought for a just cause. The focus on the initiation of war did little to minimize its
frequency and damage.
The work of Francisco de Vitoria, a sixteenth century philosopher and
theologian who criticized the Spanish conquest of the Americas on several grounds,
60.
Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law:
Challengesfrom the "War on Terror," 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 55, 55 n.1 (2003). Where

the jus ad bellum fits in is often unclear-some see its codification in the United Nations
Charter.
61.
It is estimated that between 3.5 and 6.5 million combatants were killed in the
Napoleonic wars of 1803-1815. See Gabriella Blum, The DispensableLives of Soldiers, 2 J.
LEG. ANALYSIS 115, 141 (2010). A century later, World War I involved an estimated 20
million military casualties, and then World War II produced at least 40 million. See M. Cherif
Bassouini, Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 269, 279-80
(2010). Unfortunately, accurate death tolls are not available for ancient wars, and even in
modern conflicts the numbers of casualties can be difficult to determine. But even Steven
Pinker, who argued in a recent bestselling book that "we may be living in the most peaceable
era in our species' existence," acknowledged that the twentieth century produced more violent
deaths than any previous one. STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY
VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED xxi, 193 (2011). Pinker presents detailed data on war casualties,
but scales the numbers to adjust for population growth and concludes that the rate of violent
deaths relative to overall human population has decreased. See id. at 194-95.
62.
David Luban, War Crimes: The Law of Hell, in WAR: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 267 (Larry May ed., 2008) [hereinafter Luban, War Crimes]. Luban notes that
in World War I, civilians made up fewer than 10% of the total casualties. By World War II,
civilian casualties were 50% of the total, and in contemporary conflicts, civilian casualties
make up 90% of the total. Id; see also WHITMAN, supra note 51, at 235-37; Valerie Epps,
Civilian Casualtiesin Modern Warfare: The Death of the Collateral Damage Rule, 41 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 307, 319-26 (2013).
63.
An excellent survey of these arguments, and more broadly of the early modem
theories of war that motivated the jus in bello, is JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, IDEOLOGY,
REASON, AND THE LIMITATION OF WAR: RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR CONCEPTS 1200-1740

(1975).
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was particularly influential.6 4 Vitoria did not think this conquest was justified by
Spain's aspiration to convert new world "heathens" to Christianity; nor did he
believe that enforcement of the laws of nature, another purported rationale, could
generally serve as a just cause for war. 65 In exploring these limitations on the jus ad
bellum, Vitoria considered the possibility that both sides in a war might be justified.
Earlier thinkers had rejected such a possibility altogether, but Vitoria suggested the
possibility of what later scholars have called "simultaneous ostensible justice. 66
Each side may believe, in good faith, that its cause is just. Only one is truly right,
but the participants in the war-and even third party observers-are ill equipped to
determine which side that is. Those who wrongly believed themselves to be acting
justly may suffer from what Vitoria called "invincible ignorance." 67 These epistemic
limitations-the ignorance of those who fight wrongfully, and the inability to
identify such people or nations-led Vitoria to argue for principles of restraint in the
68
conduct of war, principles independent of the justice of the initial decision to fight.
As one scholar summarizes Vitoria's position:
[W]hile in truth (i.e., in the sight of God) there is no such thing as
a war just on both sides, human knowledge is not up to judging
this with any degree of accuracy. The natural implication is that
in fighting a war, one should develop as many restraints as
possible, given that those who oppose you may not be guilty of
69
genuine fault, but merely of invincible ignorance.
Other thinkers, some of them motivated by religious belief and some
staking their claims on secular principles, joined Vitoria in this argument for
independent principles of restraint, separate from just war claims.7 0 Of particular
interest is the "regular war" doctrine, which emphasized the equality of sovereign
nations and rejected the suggestion that resort to war should be evaluated by an
inquiry into just cause. 7' A central theme of regular war theorists is that "just cause
will be indeterminable in concrete cases." 7 2 Because just cause is indeterminable,
each side has equal bilateral rights to engage in war, but each side should also
observe certain restraints in the conduct of war. The phrase "regular war" is meant
to suggest regulatedwar, or war subject to prescribed rules. The regular war doctrine
sees war as litigation by other means, but in the absence of a judge:
As in a legal process in which litigants are presumed to have
entered the proceedings in good faith, [belligerents] were likewise
entitled to exercise the same legal prerogatives . . . vis-t-vis each

65.
66.
67.

Vitoria's most important works on the laws of war are collected in FRANCISCO
& Jeremy Lawrance eds., 1991).
See id. at 350.
See JOHNSON, supra note 63, at 186-87.
See, e.g., VITORIA, supra note 64, at 313.

68.

See id. at 314-26.

64.

DE VITORIA, POLITICAL WRITINGS (Anthony Pagden

Rengger, supra note 50, at 38.
69.
70.
See, e.g., Francisco Suarez, On War, in SELECTIONS FROM
836-54 (James Brown Scott ed., Clarendon Press 1944) (1621).
71.
See Reichberg, supra note 48, at 16-18.
72.
Id. at 17.
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other. By the same token, once the war was under way, they were
expected to abide by a uniform code of conduct.73
As put by Alberico Gentili, a leading thinker in the regular war school of thought:
[I]t is the nature of wars for both sides to maintain that they are
supporting a just cause. [Though] the purest and truest form of
justice . . . cannot conceive of both parties to a dispute being in

the right . .. we for the most part are unacquainted with that truth.
Therefore we aim at justice as it appears from man's standpoint.7 4
In short, scholars and commentators began to see that thejus ad bellum was
an ineffective way to restrain the conduct of war, and they began to look for
alternatives. Perhaps it should not surprise us that to articulate justifications for war,
and then to tell states, "don't go to war unless you're justified in doing so," is a poor
strategy to limit warfare. Justifying violence is a good way to win support for it. It's
a good way to motivate soldiers and officers. It's a good way to overcome natural
or learned inhibitions to do violence. It's a good way to add self-righteous energy to
the conduct of war. But it's not a good way to limit war.
After Vitoria and his contemporaries, the philosophy of war began to place
increasing emphasis on rules for the ethical conduct of war that were independent
of the principles of "just cause." This is how the modern jus in bello developed. And
as I have already emphasized, the jus in bello has produced not just philosophical
writings, but also the field of law known as international humanitarian law, which
includes, among other things: proportionality restrictions on military attacks; the
principle of discrimination that distinguishes soldiers from civilians and seeks to
protect the latter from injury; categorical bans on certain types of weapons; and
75
categorical bans of torture and cruel, inhumane, degrading treatment.
Two other general characteristics of philosophical work on war are worth
emphasizing. First is the field's close engagement with the facts and realities of
war-with historical experience and empirical data. Philosophies of war tend to
engage with the real consequences and real experiences of real wars. They discuss

73.

Id. at 16.

74.
RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 31 (1999) (quoting ALBERICO
GENTLI, DE IURE BELLI 31 (1589)).
75.
For just a few of the international instruments that codify the jus in bello
principles, see PROTOCOL II ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF MINES,
BOOBY-TRAPS AND OTHERDEVICES, Oct. 10, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-1(A) (1997), 1342
U.N.T.S. 168 (codifying principles of discrimination and restricting types of weapons);
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct.
10, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-25 (1994), 1342 U.N.T.S. 137 (codifying principles of
discrimination and restricting types of weapons); Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46. U.N. Doc.
A/RES/39/46 (June 26, 1987); Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art.
57(2)(a)(iii), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (codifying proportionality restrictions on military
attacks). For a more thorough survey of the relevant codifications and legal instruments, see
THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008).
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historical examples and address empirical data.76 This is true even of work by moral
philosophers, thinkers who are not themselves empirical researchers. I have already
noted that philosophies of war tend to be acutely aware of violence of war. In this
field, there is little of the resistance to the language of violence found in
conversations about punishment or policing. Even the thinkers most adamant that
wars can be justified are usually candid about the fact that they are justifying violent,
destructive, harmful conduct.7 7 This is not to suggest that the ethics of war is entirely
free of euphemism. Civilian deaths are often labeled "collateral damage," a phrase
that can obfuscate the violence of war.7 8 But even when that phrase is used, on most
accounts collateral damage is in fact central, not collateral, to the ethical evaluation
of war. Under the principle of the jus in bello, proportionality may render a strike
unlawful-for example, because the given strike will cause significant collateral
damage to civilians.7 9 Political realities matter, too; even "idealist" theorists of war
emphasize the need for "a solid and realistic appreciation of the operation of
international politics." 0 Finally, even factual or moral uncertainties-of which there
are many in the fog of war-are themselves a fact taken seriously by philosophers
of war. Philosophies of war tend to address humans' epistemic and psychological
limitations, and they seek to develop an ethics of violence that can govern our
conduct even under conditions of imperfect knowledge.8
Second, ethical and philosophical reflections on war pay close attention to
the state. With some exceptions, war is something that states wage. So the ethics of
war must confront the state as a complex entity; it must struggle with the challenges
82
of regulating that entity and the various individuals who act on behalf of it.
Relatedly, philosophers of war are concerned with questions of responsibility-with
76.
See generally MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL
ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS (4th ed., 2006) (as the subtitle of the book,
suggests, Walzer's work makes extensive use of empirical data and examples).
77.
See, e.g., Hurka, supranote 49, at 127 ("[J]ust war theory does not ignore the
consequences of war and would not be credible if it did: a morally crucial fact about war is
that it causes death and destruction.").
78.
See David Lefkowitz, Collateral Damage, in WAR: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 145 (Larry May ed., 2008) ("Collateral damage ... refers to harm done to
illegitimate targets of war as a side effect of attacks on legitimate targets of war.").
79.
See JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY, AND THE USE OF FORCE
BY STATES 93-94 (2004). Nor is collateral damage a constraint on attackers alone; defending
forces are obligated to minimize collateral damage as well. See Matthew C. Waxman,
Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1391-92 (2008).
80.
DAVID RODIN, WAR & SELF-DEFENSE xii (2002); see also Luban, War Crimes,
supra note 62, at 271 (characterizing efforts to develop rules for war as a project in "practical
humanitarianism"); Jeff McMahan, The Morality of War and the Law of War, in JUST AND
UNJUST WARRIORS: THE LEGAL AND MORAL STATUS OF SOLDIERS (David Rodin & Henry
Shue eds., 2008).
81.
See, e.g., Michael J. Davidson, War and the Doubtful Soldier, 19 NOTRE DAME
J. L. ETH. & PUB. POL. 91 (2005).
82.
Even commentators skeptical about the degree to which international law can
effectively constrain states are focused on the state, and the ways in which laws of war do,
indirectly, shape states' behavior. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, A Theory of the Laws of War, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 308-09, 314-15 (2003).
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the question of what can and should be done when the conditions of the jus ad bellum
or the jus in bello are not met. It is not enough to say, "here is the ethical way to
fight a war"; the philosophy of war also struggles with the question of what to do
when its proscriptive rules are violated, as they inevitably will be. So, for example,
theorists of war explore state responsibility versus individual responsibility-when
is the state itself responsible for a violation of the laws of war, and when is
responsibility more properly attributed to an individual military officer or soldier?8 3
And finally, though state responsibility has most often referred to state responsibility
for wrongdoing, 8 in recent years theorists have increasingly emphasized the
question of state responsibility for even legitimate violence." Even if a war adheres
to all relevant ethical requirements, it is bound to cause damage beyond the direct
harm to military targets. Is the state that wages war then responsible for mitigating
or repairing that damage? This inquiry is sometimes framed as part of the jus post
bellum-the ethical rules applicable in the immediate aftermath of a war. 86 As
observed by the poet and Nobel laureate Wislawa Szymborska, born in Poland in
the 1920s and no stranger to wars and their aftermath, "After every war, someone
has to clean up .

. .

. Someone has to push the rubble to the side of the road, so the

corpse-filled wagons can pass." 87 Clearing rubble and removing corpses or
otherwise rebuilding damaged societies is the subject of the jus post bellum, and it
may be the responsibility of a state that was entirely justified in going to war and
wreaking destruction in the first place.
In short, philosophies of war are concerned about real war; they seek to be
relevant to the actual military practices that take place in the world. This
philosophical field has undoubtedly shaped positive law, even if the degree to which
the law has altered actual practices remains a matter of dispute." The jus in bello is
the foundation for international humanitarian law. Among its many attempts to limit
the violence of war are: categorical bans on certain types of weapons, a general
principle of noncombatant immunity, and rules for the treatment of prisoners of

83.
See, e.g., BEATRICE I. BONAFE, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES (2009); GEORGE P. FLETCHER,
ROMANTICS AT WAR: GLORY AND GUILT IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM (2002); NINA H.B.
JORGENSEN, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES (2003); Kristen E.
Boon, Regime Conflicts and the U.N. Security Council: Applying the Law of Responsibility,

42 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 787 (2010).
84.
See Gabriella Blum, The Crime and Punishment of States, 38

YALE J. INT'LL.

57, 58 (2013) [hereinafter Blum, The Crime and Punishment of States] (noting that
contemporary international law uses the language of responsibility to discuss state
wrongdoing, rather than the language of guilt or punishment).
85.
See, e.g., DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIANISM passim (2005).
86.
See, e.g., JusPOSTBELLUM: MAPPING THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS (Carsten

Stahn et al eds., 2014); Kristen E. Boon, Obligations of the New Occupier: The Contours of
a Jus Post Bellum, 31 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 57 (2009).
87.
Wislawa Szymborska, The End and the Beginning, in MIRACLE FAIR:
SELECTED POEMS OF WISLAWA SZYMBORSKA 48, 48 (Joanna Trzeciak trans., 2001).
See infra Part II.C (further discussing the effects of international humanitarian
88.
law).
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war.t All of these rules are breached at times, of course; some recent violations
have been remarkable. But to most of the world, even if not to the countries breaking
the rules, violations of the laws of war are seen as violations and condemned as
such.9 0 This is an achievement, albeit not yet an adequate one.

B. The Disappointments of Punishment Theory
For each of the features of philosophies of war emphasized in the previous
Subpart, one can draw a sharp contrast to philosophies of punishment. Most
importantly, perhaps, punishment theory is overwhelmingly focused on the
question: "what justifies punishment?" Like the jus ad bellum that once dominated
philosophies of war, the jus ad poena occupies the attention of criminal law
philosophers. As we shall see, this focus on justifying punishment has served no
better to limit punishment than the focus on justifying war served to limit war, but
philosophers of punishment do not typically frame their projects or measure their
own success in terms of limiting state violence. Moreover, while philosophies of
war have engaged with the facts of real armed conflicts, philosophies of punishment
tend toward ideal theory, imagining hypothetical criminals who bear little
resemblance to real-world offenders, and sometimes specifically eschewing any
obligation to grapple with actual punishment practices. And the state is all but absent
in punishment theory-taken for granted as the source of criminal law and the
enforcer of punishment, but otherwise left unexamined and, consequently,
unrestrained.
The primary aim of punishment theory, and indeed of criminal law theory,
has been to articulate general justifications for the institution of punishment. 91
Usually, the arguments offered are explicitly or implicitly moral rather than political,
in that they rely on moral intuition or moral principles rather than claims of political

89.
See Reichberg, supra note 48, at 16.
90.
It is reasonably clear, for example, that waterboarding and other "coercive
interrogation" techniques used by the United States against suspected terrorists breached the
Convention Against Torture. It is likely that neither the officials who adopted the coercive
interrogation policy nor the individuals who implemented it will be held formally accountable
for that breach. But most international observers do view the coercive interrogations as a
breach, and that recognition demonstrates the moral authority, if not the practical force, of the
rules limiting state violence.
91.
One can hardly cite examples here without making arbitrary selections from a
cluttered field. But some of the best-known and most cited works from the past half-century
include R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS (1986); NICOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT:
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY VALUES (1988); MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME:
A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW (1997); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE
CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976); Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in
DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY (1970); Jean Hampton,
The Retributive Idea, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS & MERCY 111
(1990); Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475 (1968), reprinted in
SENTENCING 93 (Hyman Gross & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 1981); see also Mitchell N.

Berman, Punishment and Justification, 118 ETHICS 258, 258 (2008) (noting that the need to

justify punishment is the "first premise" of most theorists writing on the subject).
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theory. 9 The focus on justification is so central to punishment theory that scholars
have struggled to even define punishment without already entangling themselves in
the issue of justification.93 Punishment is, of course, a very common real-world
practice, like war, but the real world is not the departure point for punishment theory.
This leaves the philosopher in need of a definition, and in defining punishment,
philosophers are always already justifying it. Furthermore, criminal law theorists
frequently claim that one cannot answer many other questions of criminal law
theory-what to criminalize, how to define specific offenses or defenses, how to
make enforcement choices, how much to punish-without first adopting a general
theory of the justification of punishment.94 The last of these questions-how much
to punish-becomes particularly important if we recognize punishment as a form of
state violence in need of regulation. As discussed in more detail below, to the extent
that theorists have sought to articulate limiting principles for punishment, these
limiting principles have turned out to be mere reassertions of justifying principles.
If the question is the justification of punishment, the scholarly reply is
nearly always one or more of four usual suspects: retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation. They are by far the four most commonly invoked
rationales for punishment in contemporary Anglo-American scholarship. Almost all
contemporary punishment theorists defend punishment with reference to one or
more of these rationales. For the past three or four decades, retributivism has been
especially prevalent among academic philosophers,95 though some commentators

92.

See, e.g., Michael Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in PRINCIPLED

SENTENCING 188 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 1998). But see Doug Husak,
Why Punish the Deserving, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAw: SELECTED ESSAYS 393

(2010) ("[A] political theory is required in addition to a moral theory if we hope to identify
the conditions in addition to desert that must be satisfied in order to justify state
punishment.").
93.
See, e.g., John Griffiths, The Limits of Criminal Law Scholarship, 79 YALE
L.J. 1388, 1406-19 (1970) (reviewing HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL

SANCTION (1968), and criticizing it for entangling questions of definition with questions of
justification).
94.

See Darryl K. Brown, CriminalLaw Theory and CriminalJustice Practice,49

AM. CRIM. L. REv. 73, 74-76 (2012) (noting that criminal law theory encompasses questions
of criminalization and enforcement as well as punishment, but finding all three inquiries to
be dominated by the discourse of retributive and consequentialist justifications for
punishment). But see Nicola Lacey, Philosophy, History, and CriminalLaw Theory, 1 BuFF.
CRvI. L. REv. 295, 300-01 (1998) (cataloging a range of inquiries that comprise criminal law
theory, of which the justification of punishment is only one). Even a scholar who claims to
find the justification of punishment a "boring" subject nevertheless characterizes it as "the
most fundamental question for criminal law." See also Robinson, supra note 17, at 1089.
Robinson frames his own inquiry as one concerning the proper distribution of punishment,
but answers that inquiry by adopting a desert-based justification of punishment. Id. at 1090,
1104-10.
95.
The prevalence of retributivism is noted often, and ruefully, by its few critics.
See, e.g., Russell L. Christopher, DeterringRetributivism: The Injustice of 'Just'Punishment,

96 Nw. U. L. REv. 843, 844-45 (2002) ("Retributivism is all the rage.... [R]etributivism's
rapid rise since the early 1970s has been remarkable."); David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of
Retributivism, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1623, 1623 (1992) ("[R]etributivism . . . has in recent

years enjoyed so vigorous a revival that it can fairly be regarded today as the leading
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prefer the term "desert" to "retribution."9 The basic retributive idea is that
punishment is justified because the offender deserves it; on most accounts, the
criminal's desert is a matter of moral culpability or blameworthiness.9 7 As the front
runner among punishment theories, retributivism attracts a sharp minority critique,
and scholars frequently revisit the contest between desert-based retributive theories
and consequentialist theories that justify punishment with reference to deterrence or
other social goods. 98 I will not attempt to rehearse and rebut each major
philosophical approach. 99 Instead, the remainder of this Part identifies a few
characteristics that are common to most accounts of the normative legitimacy of
punishment, and that are especially pronounced in now-dominant retributive
theories. Briefly, punishment theory tends to ignore the state, to pay little attention
to actual sanctions, and to generalize so broadly about crimes and criminals that the
theory loses connection with real practices. (Again, the contrast to philosophies of
philosophical justification of the institution of criminal punishment."). The rhetoric of
retribution is also quite prevalent outside the academy, but the popular discourse of retribution
varies from academic retributivism in significant ways. See Alice Ristroph, Desert,
Democracy and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1313-27 (2006)
[hereinafter Ristroph, Sentencing Reform]. Relatedly, Kyron Huigens has identified (and
criticized) what he calls "commonplace punishment theory," defined as "a more or less well
defined set of truisms that serve on an ad hoc basis whenever a bit of theory seems to be called
for in ordinary criminal law practice, criminal justice policymaking, or scholarly articles on
criminal law doctrine." Kyron Huigens, Commonplace Punishment Theory, 2005 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 437, 437.
96.
See Ristroph, Sentencing Reform, supra note 95, at 1298-1301 (noting the
shift in terminology from retribution to desert).
97.
See, e.g., Moore, supra note 92. So dominant is this way of thinking about
punishment that a recent work identifies as "criminal theory's cardinal question" Henry Hart's
inquiry, "[W]hat are the ingredients of moral blameworthiness which warrant a judgment of
community condemnation?" See Joshua Kleinfeld, A Theory of Victimization, 65 STAN. L.
REv. 1087, 1089-90 (2013) (quoting Henry M. Hart Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 412 (1958)). Notice how much is taken for granted in this
"cardinal question" of the field: it assumes that blameworthiness is a sufficiently determinate
concept to serve as a legal standard, that it is moral blameworthiness that matters, and that
moral blameworthiness can justify punishment (but note also the squeamishness about the
term punishment and the substitution of "community condemnation"). Each of these
assumptions is highly contestable, but not actually contested by mainstream criminal law
theorists. The debate, as Kleinfeld says, is limited to the narrow question of the ingredients
of moral blameworthiness. Id. For further discussion of punishment theorists' squeamishness
about actual punishment, see infra note 118 and accompanying text.
98.
As colorfully described by Erik Luna:
Punishment theories brutalize one another, staking out turf on principle
and refusing to budge from their respective positions. As a result, the
various theoretical camps spend most of their time on three endeavors:
demonstrating the superiority of their approach to criminal sanctioning,
subjecting all other theories to harsh criticism, and repairing the damage
done to their own theory from equally severe attacks.
Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative
Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REv. 205, 205 (2003).
99.
See generally DAVID BooNIN, THE PROBLEM OF PUNISHMENT (2008) (taking
this more comprehensive approach); DEIRDRE GOLASH, THE CASE AGAINST PUNISHMENT
(2006) (same).
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war should quickly become clear.) Amid its immersion in justifications for
punishment and abstractions of crime, criminal (and sanction) punishment theory
has not been framed as an effort to limit actual state violence, and (unsurprisingly)
it has not served that end well.
Given that philosophers are interested in state-imposed sanctions, rather
than punishments within the family or other institutions, it is surprising how little
attention punishment theory has typically given to the state.' 00 The focus, especially
in retributive theory, is on the target of punishment-the offender-rather than the
agent of punishment. Of course, most discussions of punishment assume the
existence of some entity that will impose the punishment, and that entity is
frequently labeled "the state." But the nature of that punishing entity-who or what
constitutes the state, and how its various subsidiary institutions work together-was
simply overlooked by many leading accounts of just punishment for several
decades.' 0 ' It should be noted, though, that these core questions of political theory
are slowly making their way into punishment theory, and with good reason. 0 2 A
theory of punishment, or any other form of violence, should include an account of
the agents that impose it.' 0 3 And a clear account of the identity and structure of the
state is especially important if we seek to regulate policing and punishment. We
need to be able to explain what counts as state action, and to understand the impacts
of restraints or sanctions on state actors. We need an account of the state as both
agent of punishment and object of legal regulation. To be sure, the punishment
theorist need not himself tackle all the big questions of political theory. 104 One could
rely on a philosophical division of labor; one could simply adopt or amend some

100.
"If the state appears in discussions of punishment theory at all, it's often as an
afterthought, a political epilogue to a moral treatise." Markus D. Dubber, Legitimating Penal
Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 2597, 2597 (2007).
101.
The oversight was noted by several scholars. See, e.g., 1 GEORGE FLETCHER,
THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL 153
(2007); LACEY, supra note 91; Guyora Binder, Punishment Theory: Moral or Political?, 5
BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 321 (2002).
102.
See, e.g., Symposium, PoliticalTheory and Criminal Punishment, 8 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 281 (2011); see also R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY
(2001); PUNISHMENT AND POLITICAL THEORY (Matt Matavers ed., 1999); Dolovich, supra
note 12; Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1421 (2004).
103.
Guyora Binder, Authority to Proscribeand Punish InternationalCrimes, 63
U. TORONTO L.J. 278, 285 (2013) ("[J]ustifying punishment is always a problem of justifying
the jurisdiction of a particular punishing authority.").

104.
Alan Brudner describes penal law theory as a branch, but only a branch, of
political theory: "[p]enal law theory is not coextensive with political theory." ALAN BRUDNER,
PUNISHMENT AND FREEDOM: A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE PENAL LAw, at ix, 16 (2009). Brudner
distinguishes a theory of punishment from "a broad theory of the legitimate state authority to
coerce," and disclaims any obligation to address "larger questions concerning the grounds
and limits of political obligation." Id. at 16. It is not clear exactly which questions are the
"larger" ones that Brudner disavows. But of course a theory of punishment should account
for the state's ability to coerce in this particular way, and a theory of punishment should
explain the grounds and limits of political obligation insofar as a breach of obligation is cited
to justify punishment. See Alice Ristroph, When Freedom Isn 't Free, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REv.
468 (2011) [hereinafter Ristroph, When Freedom Isn 'tFree] (developing a lengthier critique
of Brudner's book).
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preexisting account of the state and proceed from there. But a theory of state
punishment needs a theory of the state, whether original or borrowed.'0 o
The failure to describe the agent of punishment in any detail leads to a
further weakness: punishment theory tends to operate in the passive voice, meaning
that it has more to say about why a criminal should be punished than it does about
why the state should do the punishing.0 6 This weakness is especially prevalent in
retributive theories that focus on the concept of desert. As noted by George Fletcher,
"Just because the offender might deserve punishment, it does not follow-without
an appropriate theory of state power-that the state should assess the degree of
deserved punishment and use its power to impose it on the offender."' 0 7 Indeed, the
assumption that the state is entitled to assess desert and impose punishment on that
basis turns out to be especially hard to defend if one adopts a fairly standard liberal
account of the state. That account, roughly based on the theory of John Rawls, who
was in turn inspired by earlier social-contract theorists, argues that the normative
legitimacy of the state is based on the hypothetical consent of individual citizens.10s
Because punishment theorists have so often neglected political theory, there is a
sharp disjuncture between accounts of normative political legitimacy, where consent
105.
Most punishment theorists simply say nothing of substance about the state; a
few, as noted above, have recently sought to devise specifically political justifications for
punishment. See DUFF, supra note 102; Dolovich, supra note 12. A very different response
comes from Michael Davis, who explicitly denies that punishment theorists should offer an
account of the state or a theory of political legitimacy. Michael Davis, The Relative
Independence of Punishment Theory, in To MAKE THE PUNISHMENT FIT THE CRIME: ESSAYS
IN THE THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 18 (1992). Davis accuses his critics of unfairly
"build[ing] political theory into the very concept of criminal punishment" and suggests
ominously that those who refer to "the state" may harbor a "Hegelian or Marxist agenda." Id.
at 18-19, 37 n.5. Curiously, Davis identifies a detailed list of necessary assumptions for any
plausible theory of punishment or any plausible political theory. These necessary
"preconditions" for political theory and punishment theory include "moral principles
permitting institution of a system of criminal punishment." Id. at 22-23. In other words, we
must assume the moral permissibility of punishment before we even begin to tackle political
or punishment theory. Once we have made that assumption and the others that Davis asserts
are necessary, one wonders why we should take up punishment theory at all. On Davis's
account, punishment theory is not merely independent of political theory, but entirely
superfluous.
106.
See Davis, supra note 105, at 22-23. One illustration comes from the Michael
Davis essay discussed in the previous footnote. Among the necessary assumptions of any
punishment theory, according to Davis, are the fact of rational agents who can exercise selfcontrol; the fact that these agents sometimes act in ways that should be prohibited; "a set of
moral constraints on what may be prohibited or allowed"; "a set of moral constraints on when
agents may be held responsible for what they have done"; and "a set of moral constraints on
what may be done to a rational agent." Id. at 22-23. Note that after characterizing criminals
as agents, Davis switches to the passive voice to describe punishment: acts should be
prohibited; agents may be held responsible; and agents should be treated in accordance with
their desert. On Davis's account, moral agents commit crimes, but punishment just happens.
The punishing agent (as opposed to the law-breaking agent) disappears.
107.
FLETCHER, supra note 101, at 153 ("The quick assumption that the state is
entitled to punish offenders who 'deserve' it is one of the unfortunate banalities of criminal
law in our time.").
108.
See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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is the "gold standard," and accounts of justified punishment, where relatively few
scholars suggest that punishment is justified by the consent of the condemned.' 0 9
Instead of consent, punishment theorists rely on desert-and on most accounts, one
need not have consented to punishment in order to deserve it. Importantly, though,
Rawls himself argued that if individuals were to select basic principles of justice
while ignorant of their own particular attributes, they would avoid any system in
which social goods were distributed on the basis of desert, since desert is in turn a
product of "morally arbitrary" characteristics.110 Although Rawls denied that his
own critique of desert as a distributive principle could extend to criminal
punishment, he offered little support for this claim."' As a few commentators have
noted, a Rawlsian view of the state may not be compatible with a normative theory
of punishment as the "just deserts" of the offender.112
More generally, liberal political theorists, including but not limited to
Rawls, have argued that the state should be neutral with respect to conceptions of
the good and should avoid promoting any particular moral theory.13 This view of
the state seems to raise particular difficulties for expressive theories of punishment,
or those retributive theories in which punishment is justified as a kind of moral
condemnation of objectionable conduct. If punishment is indeed an expression of
moral disapproval, then it is not clear that a liberal state should be involved in
punishment at all.114 Some scholars see in this conflict a reason to reject liberal
neutrality, or otherwise amend liberalism, rather than a reason not to punish. "'
Whatever one's stance on the principle of state neutrality, the key point is that a
theory of punishment should explain and defend the state's role as the agent of
punishment. This is certainly true if we are concerned about devising limiting

109.

But see Dolovich, supra note 12, at 315-16 (developing a justification of

punishment based on hypothetical consent). See also infra notes 133-36 and accompanying
text.
110.
RAWLS, supra note 108, at 103-04.
111.
Id. at 314-15. For a more detailed explanation of Rawls's position, and a

critique of it, see Ristroph, Sentencing Reform, supra note 95, at 1340-41. Notably, in his
well-known discussion of punishment written prior to A THEORY OF JUSTICE, Rawls allowed
only a very limited role for retribution. He argued that retribution could explain why a specific
individual criminal received punishment, but it could not justify the institution of punishment.
See generally John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955), reprinted in THE
PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT: A COLLECTION OF PAPERS 109 (H.B. Acton ed., 1969).
112.
See BONNIE HONIG, POLITICAL THEORY AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF POLITICS
138-39 (1993); see also Dolovich, supra note 12 (for an attempt to reconcile a desert-based
punishment theory with Rawlsian political theory).
113.
See e.g., Peter Jones, The Ideal of the Neutral State, in LIBERAL NEUTRALITY

9 (Robert E. Goodin & Andrew Reeve eds., 1989).
114.
Several scholars have noted the conflict. See, e.g., Stanley C. Brubaker, Can
Liberals Punish?,82 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 821 (1988); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Retributivism,Moral
Education,and the Liberal State, 4 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3 (1985).
115.
See Brubaker, supra note 114, at 831-33; see also Christopher Bennett,
Expressive Punishment and PoliticalAuthority, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 285, 311-18 (2011);
Thaddeus Metz, How to Reconcile Liberal Politics with Retributive Punishment, 27 OXFORD
J. LEG. STUD. 683, 697-705 (2007).
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principles for punishment, but it is true even for those focused solely on questions
of justification." 6
Without a direct focus on the agent of punishment, theorists will have little
to say about what should happen if that agent makes a mistake or otherwise fails to
perform as it should. And in fact, philosophies of punishment set forth the conditions
of just punishment, but they have little to say about what happens when those
conditions are not met. The field of punishment theory offers no inquiry into state
responsibility, correctional officers' responsibility, or police officers' responsibility,
that is parallel to the inquiries into state responsibility in the ethics of war." 7
The failure to address the agent of punishment is not the only shortcoming
frequently found in theories of punishment. Punishment theory too often neglects
the state, but perhaps even more egregiously (and surprisingly), it neglects the
sanction. That is, punishment theories say surprisingly little about the exact way in
which offenders are to be punished." 8 An important exception may prove the rule:
there is considerable scholarly attention given to the death penalty as a specific
choice of sanction." 9 Otherwise, however, theorists of punishment rarely explain
why incarceration, fines, or any other specific sanction is permissible or

116.
In other words, when we focus only on the recipient of punishment, the
allegedly deserving wrongdoer, we fail to offer a complete justification of punishment:
A complete theory of punishment must concern itself not merely with the
moral desirability of the goals sought by punishment (for example,
deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, moral education) but also with the
equally important question whether the pursuit of these goals is part of
the legitimate business of the state-whether these goals are properly
realized through the mechanism of state coercion.
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 509, 510-

11 (1987).
117.

See Alice Ristroph, Responsibilityfor the Criminal Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL

107 (R.A. Duff & Stuart Green eds., 2011) (offering
preliminary observations on state responsibility in the criminal justice context).
118.
A similar, but distinct, flaw of mainstream punishment theories is their failure
to engage fully with actual punishment practices (except occasionally to despair at them). See
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CRIMINAL LAw

Robert Weisberg, Reality-ChallengedPhilosophies of Punishment, 95 MARQ. L. REv. 1203

(2012).
119.

See, e.g., MATTHEW H. KRAMER, THE ETHICS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION OF EVIL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (2012); AUSTIN SARAT,
WHEN THE STATE KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN CONDITION (2002); Claire
Finkelstein, A ContractarianArgument Against the Death Penalty, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1283
(2006); Chad Flanders, The Case Against the Case Against the Death Penalty, 16 NEW CRI.
L. REv. 595 (2013); Dan Markel, State Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the
Commutation of DeathRow and the Abolition ofthe Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REv.
407 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is CapitalPunishmentMorally Required?
Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REv. 703 (2005). There is also a

growing scholarly literature that addresses and critiques the specific sanction of solitary
confinement, but the critiques are usually based on a claim that solitary confinement
constitutes torture rather than an appeal to punishment theory. See, e.g., Jules Lobel,
ProlongedSolitary Confinement and the Constitution, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 115 (2008).
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appropriate.12 Instead, punishment is defined in fairly abstract terms, as "hard
treatment" or "unpleasant consequences" or "legal deprivation," imposed by public
authority pursuant to specified procedures.121 For example, H.L.A. Hart defined
punishment as: (1) "pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant";
(2) imposed for an offense; (3) imposed on an actual or supposed offender; (4)
"intentionally administered by human beings other than the offender"; and (5)
"imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal system against
which the offense is committed." 122 In this five-part definition, much greater
emphasis is placed on the rule-of-law apparatus surrounding the sanction than on
the sanction itself. And Hart is not unusual-his own definition of punishment is
widely followed, and other oft-cited definitions take a similar approach.123 Note the
contrast to the philosophies of war discussed in Part IIA: the violent realities of war
are openly acknowledged by theorists of war-indeed, the violence of war is part of
what claims the theorists' intellectual attention. In punishment theory, abstractions
such as hard treatment or unpleasant consequences allow the philosopher to avoid
any direct discussion of the precise sanction, and thus the philosopher need never
acknowledge or address the violence inherent in familiar sanctions, such as
incarceration or execution. Rather, as noted above, philosophical definitions of
punishment often seemed custom-made for the task of normative justification,
insofar as they refer only obliquely to the gritty details of the penalty and build
normatively desirable constraints into the definition.
Related to this claim that punishment theory says too little about the
sanction itself, one could say that punishment theory has focused on the ends at the
expense of the means. Theories of punishment usually aspire to fulfill either or both
of the following goals: an ethical or moral justification for punishment, and a
description of the political or sociological function of punishment. Retributive
theories typically focus on the former goal; utilitarian or consequentialist theories
pay more attention to the second (but usually share the first goal as well, assuming
or arguing that the function of punishment provides an ethical justification for it).
Unfortunately, in too much of the punishment theory literature, these two goals are
conflated into a single broad claim about "the purpose of punishment," or to use
H.L.A. Hart's famous phrase, its "general justifying aim."" Theorists then spill a

120.

But see Adam J. Kolber, Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L.

REv. 182 (2009).
121.
See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 4 (1968) ("unpleasant consequences"); Feinberg, supra note 91, at 98
("hard treatment" and "authoritative deprivations"); Rawls, supra note 1118, at 111-12
("legal deprivation").
122.
HART, supra note 121, at 4-5.
123.
See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 409-12 (2000)
(adapting Hart's definition of punishment); Leo Zaibert, Uprootedness as (Cruel and
Unusual) Punishment, 11 NEw CRIM. L. REv. 384, 391 (2008) (referring to Hart's definition
as "the orthodox account of punishment in the literature").
124.
HART, supranote 121, at 4. See, e.g., Richard Frase, PunishmentPurposes,58
STAN. L. REv. 67, 69 (2005) ("Punishment purposes are positive, justifying principles .... );
Markel, supra note 102, at 1444 (providing an additional example of the equation of purpose
with justification); Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, andAmerican CriminalLaw, 89 MICH.
L. REv. 1880, 1890-91 (1991) (same). Recently, several scholars have emphasized the need
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great deal of ink arguing over the identified purpose-whether retribution is worth
pursuing, for example, or whether a purpose of general deterrence impermissibly
treats the punished individual as a mere instrument. But even if we could agree on
these questions of purpose, on the desired results of state punishment, it would still
be an open question of whether the use of superior physical force was an appropriate
way to pursue those results. Some thinkers might claim to avoid this difficulty by
eschewing all consequentialist rationales and adopting a truly deontological
retributivism, one that values retribution as an end in itself. 125 However, even
deontological retributivism can be faulted for its failure to address specific methods
of punishment. To say retribution is an end in itself does not yet establish that
imprisonment is an end in itself, and indeed it is difficult to see how the varied
experiences of incarceration could all be shown to be ends in themselves. 126 And if
imprisonment is not an end in itself, the theorist must explain why imprisonmentor a fine, or some other sanction-is the appropriate way to exact retribution. In
short, simply identifying the ends of punishment does not establish that the ends
justify the means.
A final reason to be dissatisfied with mainstream philosophical work on
punishment lies in its characterizations of crimes and criminals. Too often, a
normative theory of punishment is based on an account of crime, or an account of
the wrongdoer, that bears little relationship to actual offenses and offenders. For
example, an influential strand of retributivist theory characterizes a criminal act as
a benefit unjustly seized by the criminal. 12' The criminal exempts himself from the
obligation to follow the law, and punishment must be imposed in order to restore
the equal distribution of the law's burdens. As put by Herbert Morris, "A person
who violates the rules has something others have-the benefits of the system-but
28
by renouncing what others have assumed, he has acquired an unfair advantage."1
This "fair-play" or "benefits-and-burdens" account of punishment is widely adopted
by contemporary scholars.1 29 Others, such as Jean Hampton, questioned whether
crime could be accurately understood as a benefit; nevertheless, Hampton based her
account of punishment on a portrait of the offender as an insolent, prideful individual

to distinguish function from justification. See Marc 0. DeGirolami, Culpability in Creating
the Choice of Evils, 60 ALA. L. REv. 597, 621 n.140 (2009); Huigens, supranote 95, at 43941; John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REv. 899, 962 (2011). At the doctrinal level, the conflation of
purpose with justification is embedded in Eighth Amendment law, as discussed in Part III
below.
125.
See MOORE, supra note 91, at 90 (distinguishing retributivism from a theory
that recognizes psychological satisfaction as a social benefit of punishment). More recently,
however, Moore has suggested that the only plausible justification for punishment as a social
institution is consequentialist. "[A]t the level of justifying our general institutions of criminal,
tort, property, contract, and constitutional law, I take us all to be consequentialists." Michael
S. Moore, Four Reflections on Law and Morality, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1523, 1552
(2007).
126.
See Kolber, supra note 120, at 183-86.
127.
See, e.g., Morris, supranote 91, at 95.
Id.
128.
129.
E.g., Richard Dagger, Social Contracts, Fair Play, and the Justification of
Punishment, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 341 (2011).

1046

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 56:4

who needs to be taken down a notch. 10 As should be obvious to anyone acquainted
with real criminals, neither description captures more than a small subset of
wrongdoers. The conceptualization of a crime as a benefit and the vision of the
offender as hubristic do not describe the many impoverished and/or substanceabusing criminals whose offending is a product of weakness and desperation.131
More generally, as Jeffrie Murphy has noted, the fair-play, or benefits-and-burdens
theory of punishment, is based on unsupported assumptions about the social,
economic, and legal conditions that precede a criminal act. 132 Most criminals,
Murphy has argued, "would be hard-pressed to name the benefits for which they are
supposed to owe obedience. If justice . . . is based on reciprocity, it is hard to see
what these persons are supposed to reciprocate for."' 3 3 One need not go so far as to
argue that economic or social inequality are exclusive determinants of criminal
conduct, or that such inequalities should constitute full or partial excuses for
criminal liability, to see that any normative theory of punishment predicated on the
assumption of equality is unconvincing.
As a second example of punishment theory's mischaracterization of crimes
and criminals, consider neo-Hegelian claims that wrongdoers "will" their own
punishments-claims that could be called, in more colloquial terms, the "you-askedfor-it" theory of punishment.'3 4 This approach does not quite claim that the actual
criminal consents to his own punishment, but it substitutes for the actual criminal an
imagined being who does give such consent. In one recent excursion into neoHegelian punishment theory, Alan Brudner imagines a fictitious entity he calls the
"thinking Agent."' 3 5 The thinking Agent can do little other than think. It has no body
and hence no physical needs, and it lacks any interest in self-preservation. It also
lacks impulses and desires. It is difficult to imagine a being more different from
actual criminals than Brudner's thinking Agent-indeed, the thinking Agent is
apparently incapable of wrongdoing by definition. 3 6 And yet Brudner argues that
this disembodied but still rational being is the ideal representative of actual
criminals, and then proceeds to show that if the (hypothetical) thinking Agent were
to consider its own (hypothetical) wrongdoing, it would consent to be punished for
such wrongdoing.137
In some instances, punishment theorists' misrepresentations of crime and
criminals are simply overgeneralizations, possibly an unavoidable result of the
130.
Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND
ITS CRITICS 4, 12 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992).
131.
It is widely recognized that poverty and drug abuse are risk factors closely
associated with criminal offending. See, e.g., Nkechi Taifa & Catherine Beane, Integrative
Solutions to IntegratedIssues: A MultidisciplinaryLook Behind the Cycle of Incarceration,
3 HARv. L. & POL'Y REv. 283, 299 (2009).
132.
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217, 229-

43 (1973).
133.
134.

Id. at 240.

See generally BRUDNER, supra note 104; MARK TUNICK, HEGEL'S POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY: INTERPRETING THE PRACTICE OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT (1992).
135.
BRUDNER, supra note 104, at 3-5.
136.
137.

See id. at 45.
Id. at 37-45; see also Ristroph, When Freedom Isn't Free, supra note 104

(critiquing Brudner's argument).
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attempt to theorize an extremely diverse array of persons and their misconduct.138
Abstractions and generalizations are integral to any theory, and they are not
themselves reasons to reject a normative theory of real events or practices. But when
the philosopher's account diverges so greatly from actual experience, we must begin
to doubt whether the philosopher is theorizing and justifying the same events and
practices that we typically call crime and punishment.
The methodological and substantive differences between philosophies of
war and philosophies of punishment should be clear. Where theories of war take
seriously the facts of actual conflicts, acknowledging war's violence and grappling
with historical and empirical realities, theories of punishment operate in
abstractions, defining punishment and describing criminals in terms that often bear
little relation to real penal practices and real people. Where theories of war
acknowledge the state as an agent of war's violence and undertake difficult
questions concerning the responsibilities and regulation of states, theories of
punishment say little about the state and even less about how to regulate it. Most
importantly, perhaps, where theories of war seek explicitly to limit the violence and
destruction of war, theories of punishment have remained focused on the issue of
justification, and have contributed almost nothing to efforts to contain the
considerable and expanding exercise of penal authority. 139 Reorientation of
punishment theory is in order, and Part III develops some suggestions.

C. Causes for Resistance?
Before we see how criminal law theory might be transformed by the warpunishment analogy, we should consider two sets of objections to the very inquiry.
The first set comes from those who study international law and the laws of war, but
who view this field from a more critical perspective than the mainstream account
offered above. These critics might question whether the relationship of law to war
is indeed one of limitation, arguing that the laws of war, and the philosophies
underlying them, do more to construct and legitimize war's violence than to restrain
it.14 0 A second set of objections is likely to be raised by punishment theorists, and
centers around the claim that the relation of punisher to punished is nothing like
relations among soldiers or between soldiers and civilians. The restraints on war, the
argument might go, are based on either the moral equality of soldiers or on the

138.
A distinct but related criticism of retributive punishment theory has been
developed by scholars who emphasize that individuals experience sanctions in very different
ways that normative justifications of punishment must take into account. E.g., John Bronsteen
et al., Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 1037 (2009); Adam J. Kolber, The
Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 182 (2009).

139.
Some punishment theorists have sought to articulate "limiting principles" for
sentences, but these limiting principles are nearly invariably simply restatements of the
theorist's favored justifying principle. As a consequence, the limiting principles have had
little effect. See infra Part III.
140.
See, e.g., Nathaniel Berman, PrivilegingCombat? Contemporary Conflict and
the Legal Construction of War, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 5 (2004) ("Rather than

opposing violence, the legal construction of war serves to channel violence into certain forms
of activity engaged in by certain kinds of people, while excluding other forms engaged in by
other people.") (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted).
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innocence of civilians. A condemned criminal is easily distinguished from a
combatant, and also from a noncombatant civilian whose country is at war. Neither
of these sets of objections should lead us to abandon the effort to see what theories
and laws of war may teach theories and laws of punishment, but the objections merit
some consideration here.
The first set of objections relies on historical claims and legal analysis; it
is not strictly philosophical. The unifying suggestion is that the laws of war fail to
constrain the violence of war, but scholars vary in their explanations of this failure.
One centuries-old refrain emphasizes that the laws of war are just not effective in
practice; some scholars note that the rise of the modern laws of war in the midtwentieth century coincided with some of the most destructive wars in human
history. 141 This is an empirical claim, but there is a related normative critique:
pacifists have long argued that there is something unseemly in regulating warwhich entails the explicit licensing of some forms of warfare-rather than simply
prohibiting it altogether.142 And indeed, essential to contemporary laws of war is the
combatant's privilege-a license to kill (albeit a limited one). 143 Thus, some
commentators see a little too much self-congratulation in the claim that the laws of
war limit violence, and a little too much euphemism in the phrase "international
humanitarian law."'" In a recent and illuminating book, James Whitman argues that
the modern laws of war, with their grand humanitarian principles, actually license
wars far more destructive than the eighteenth century pitched battles waged by
European monarchs-battles that began at sunrise and ended at dusk, and confined
the bloodshed to the space of the battlefield, the bodies of designated soldiers, and
the span of a single day. 145
Frankly, there is much truth in this set of objections, especially in its claims
of law's failures. Assessing overall rates of compliance with the laws of war is itself
a difficult task, but it is certainly true that the laws of war are often ignored or
ineffective.14 6 That fact, however, has more to do with the implementation of laws
141.
See, e.g., PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAw 110 (1999).
142.
E.g., CHARLES SUMNER, THE TRUE GRANDEUR OF NATIONS 13-14 (1893).
143.
See Berman, supranote 140, at 9-10.
144.
See id. at 3; see also Jan Klabbers, Off Limits? International Law and the
Excessive Use of Force, 7 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 59, 73-74 (2006) (arguing that the laws of
war endorse righteous violence and thus defeat their own efforts to limit violence).
145.
JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE VERDICT OF BATTLE: THE LAW OF VICTORY AND THE
MAKING OF MODERN WAR 250-53 (2012). Notably, Whitman sees contemporary laws of war
as much more concerned with questions of justification-withjus ad bellum claims based on
humanitarian concerns-than I do. I think Whitman is correct that a law of war based on "the
dictates of high morality" and "a highly developed jus ad bellum, informed by a strong
commitment to the struggle against criminality and evil," is likely to produce more violence
rather than less. See id. at 252. Separately, it is worth noting that the era of pitched battles was
one in which violence was closely contained because politicalpower was closely contained.
It was the concentrated power of European monarchies, and their successful monopolization
of violence, that limited the time and space of war. See id. at 19; see also id. at 248-49. When
republics replaced monarchies and political power was more widely dispersed, the scale and
effects of war spread more broadly.
146.
See generally William Bradford, In the Minds of Men: A General Theory of
Compliance with the Laws of War, 36 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1243 (2004).

2014]

JUST VIOLENCE

1049

of war than their conceptual underpinnings. Regulating states is a difficult business;
states will often ignore or manipulate inconvenient legal standards. 147 Indeed,
theorists of war are often sensitive to the difficulties of implementation; but, this is
a strength, not a weakness, of the field. Perhaps one should say that at least
philosophers of war are identifying the right questions, even if they still search for
answers. It is also important to note that the laws of war have had some meaningful
and documented effects in discrete areas-in banning certain types of weapons, for
example, and in reducing deliberate attacks on civilians.148
The critical theorist's charge that the laws of war legitimate violence has
some truth as well. 149 To regulate war without prohibiting it altogether is,
necessarily, to license some violence. Bracketing the moral question whether some
acts of war should be licensed, one who seeks to minimize violence must ask
whether violence is better constrained by an abolitionist strategy or a jus in bello
framework. I do not think abolition bears much promise for critics of war-or for
critics of punishment, for that matter. Indeed, in a world where large majorities take
for granted that war and punishment are often morally appropriate and necessary,
the abolitionist position may just marginalize the speaker. It does seem to be the
case, though, that some strategies of limitation fare better than others. As argued in
Part IIA, the jus ad bellum's effort to limit war by justifying it was a failure. Efforts
to limit war's violence are more successful when they acknowledge violence
directly, discuss its destructiveness candidly, and seek principles of limitation that
are independent of any claims of moral justification.1'
Philosophers of punishment-and retributivists in particular-are likely to
resist the war-punishment analogy on different grounds. They might argue that the
limitations of war's violence rely on two core premises about the humans subjected
to that particular kind of violence. First, all combatants are presumed to be morally
equal and importantly, equally blameless for their conduct, so long as it complies
with the laws of war. This moral equality holds whether the initiation of the war was
justified or not, independent of the ethical or moral standing of the countries
involved in the war. "' Restrictions on the way combatants may be treated are
147.
See John Fabian Witt, The Dismal History of the Laws of War, 1 U.C. IRVINE
L. REV. 895 (2011).
148.
See Benjamin Valentino et al, Covenants Without the Sword: International
Law and the Protection of Civilians in Times of War, 58 WORLD POL. 339 (2006).
149.
See Chris Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A
CriticalHistory of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 49, 50 (1994) ("[T]he laws of war
have been formulated deliberately to privilege military necessity at the cost of humanitarian
values. As a result, the laws of war have facilitated rather than restrained wartime violence.
Through law, violence has been legitimated.").
150.
A separate objection to the arguments of this Article contests the very jus ad
bellum-jus in bello distinction, arguing that the scope of permitted conduct in war should turn
on whether the war is just or not. Jeff McMahan has argued for this position as a matter of
moral principle, but importantly, McMahan seems to concede that as a practical and legal
matter, the ad bellum-in bello distinction must be retained. See, e.g., McMahan, supra note
80, at 34-36.
151.
This principle is codified in positive law, widely defended in philosophical

writing, and as Michael Walzer explains, reflected in many letters or memoirs of soldiers
themselves:
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arguably dependent on the combatants' equal moral blamelessness. Second,
noncombatants are also presumed to be blameless and therefore worthy of protection
from violence-"innocent civilians," we say, though as just noted, the official view
of soldiers does not cast them as "guilty."
Punishment, retributivists and other philosophers might argue, presents a
completely different situation. The criminal is subjected to violence (or "hard
treatment" or "unpleasant consequences") precisely because he is guilty and
blameworthy. The moral equality that characterizes relations between soldiers and
the moral innocence that cloaks civilians who may be injured by war are simply
inapposite in the context of punishment. This is not to suggest, however, that
philosophers of punishment would deny all restraints on the power to punish.
Indeed, they might suggest that the very different context of punishment can actually
generate more restrictions on the state's power than exist in armed international
conflicts. The violence of war is waged against political strangers-soldiers and
civilians of a foreign nation without the binds of a shared community. In contrast,
the punisher and the punished share a political community and bear distinctive
obligations to each other for that reason. 152
In my view, this latter set of objections simply fails to see beyond the
philosophical status quo with respect to both war and punishment. That is, this view
takes for granted the mainstream conclusions of philosophies of war, without
understanding how those conclusions were reached. It also takes for granted the
mainstream conclusions of retributivism, treating those conclusions as facts about
the world without actually addressing the objections to those conclusions raised in
this Part and elsewhere. First, soldiers (and civilians) have not always been
understood to be morally blameless. Indeed, now-abandoned versions of the jus ad
bellum counted punishment of a deserving nation, including its citizens, as a just
cause for war.153 And the erstwhile view of war as justified punishment led to some

It is the sense that the enemy soldier, though his war may well be criminal,
is nevertheless as blameless as oneself. Armed, he is an enemy; but he
isn't my enemy in any specific sense; the war itself isn't a relation between
persons but between political entities and their human instruments. . . .
[Enemy soldiers] are "poor sods, just like me," trapped in a war they didn't
make. I find in them my moral equals.
WALZER, supra note 56, at 36 (emphasis omitted).
152.
For the most part, I have to imagine these counterarguments rather than draw
them from published literature. As noted in the Introduction, there has been almost no attempt
to apply the ethics of war to the ethics of punishment, and so punishment theorists have not
had to explain their reactions to such a project. But arguments along these lines have been
raised to me in person by Doug Husak, as thoughtful a representative of criminal law theorists
as anyone could hope to find. Moreover, the war-punishment analogy is raised by Thomas
Hobbes's theory of punishment, which I have previously tried to draw to the attention of
punishment theorists. See Alice Ristroph, Respect and Resistance in Punishment Theory, 97
CALIF. L. REv. 601 (2009) [hereinafter Ristroph, Respect and Resistance]. Chad Flanders
responds to my reading of Hobbes from a retributivist perspective, and raises objections to
the war-punishment analogy similar to those sketched in the text above. See Chad Flanders,
Retributionand Reform, 70 MD. L. REv. 87, 134-37 (2010).
See Luban, War as Punishment, supra note 48, at 307-18.
153.
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particularly brutal conflicts.1 4 The modern commitments to basic equality in war
and to respect for both foreign soldiers and civilians are the hard-won achievements
of philosophers and ethicists, not statements of the obvious or the inevitable. In this
context, it may be helpful to remember Hannah Arendt's critique of human rights
rhetoric. Arendt-a Jewish philosopher who fled the Third Reich and a person in
need of the protection of human rights law as much as anyone-worried that the
rhetoric of human rights would lead humans to view equality or other political goods
as naturally occurring objects in the world, extant things just waiting to be picked
up, rather than as human creations.' Arendt was all too aware that political equality
and respect for human dignity are fragile, contingent achievements, and she wanted
us to stay cognizant of their fragility in order to protect them more effectively.
Human rights law has, of course, sought to do the very thing that Arendt
rightly identified as so difficult: generate protections for individual human beings
that are independent of their membership in a particular political community. The
fact that human rights law has had some successes-though of course, here too the
achievements are fragile and inconsistent-shows that we need not reject the warpunishment analogy on the grounds that one form of violence takes place between
political communities and one takes place within a single community. Restrictions
on state violence need not depend upon the state's particular relationship to the
targets of violence. It is worth noting here that many of the principles of
contemporary laws of war were originally collected in the Lieber Code, a document
prepared in the American Civil War to govern the internecine violence of that
conflict, and later adapted and promulgated across the globe to govern all armed

conflicts.15 6
The prevailing conceptions of a deserving offender and a justified punisher
are indeed different from the prevailing conceptions of soldiers as morally equal or
of civilians as innocent. That is not so much an objection to my argument as a
restatement of it-at least, a restatement of the contrasts drawn in Parts II.A and
II.B. It is not surprising that desert theorists would resist the ethics of war and its
premises of equality: desert is the language of those who resist equality, or put
differently, appeals to desert are quite often efforts to justify inequality. "' But the
offender's desert is no more a natural fact about the world than is the moral equality
of combatants. Both conceptions are human constructs, the products of ethical
argument and ethical education. Both conceptions are contingent constructs: it is
possible to view enemy soldiers as blameworthy targets of punishment, and it is

154.

See id. at 330-32; see also Blum, The Crime and Punishment of States, supra

note 84, at 93-98.
155.
See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 291-99 (1951).
156.
See JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN'S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 1-4 (2012).
157.
Louis Pojman, Equality and Desert, 72 PHIL. 549, 553-54 (1997) (conceding
this point, albeit in defense of desert); see also Shelly Kagan, Equality and Desert, in WHAT

Do WE DESERVE? A READER ON JUSTICE AND DESERT 298 (Louis P. Pojman & Owen McLeod
eds., 1998); Louis P. Pojman, Does Equality Trump Desert?, in WHAT Do WE DESERVE? A
READER ON JUSTICE AND DESERT 283 (Louis P. Pojman & Owen McLeod eds., 1998).
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possible to view criminals as our equals in at least some important respects.'" One
must acknowledge, though, that the moral equality of soldiers is a far more fragile
construct than the deservingness of criminal offenders. Desert is widely accepted as
a moral, political, and legal principle, in part because the concept is elastic and easily
manipulated. 159 It is easy to secure agreement that wrongdoers deserve punishment,
because each person can assess desert using his or her preferred criteria-the
seriousness of the offense, the characteristics of the offender, the danger posed to
society, the need for deterrence, hatred of the offender, or nearly anything else at
all-and still call for punishment in a language that others with different criteria will
understand. 160 Even those who deploy desert recognize that it often serves as a proxy
for something else.161 In brief, the very shortcomings of the concept of desert may
render the rhetoric of desert nearly intractable. So I do not propose to reorient
punishment philosophies or punishment practices by persuading anyone to renounce
desert. Rather, I propose to focus on a somewhat different question. Whatever one
believes about whether or how much punishment is deserved, what external
limitations should be placed on this form of state violence?

III. TOWARD A JUSINPOENA
Criminal law in America is a growth industry, and has been for decades.
Substantive criminal law has steadily expanded; more conduct is criminalized each
year, and decriminalizations are few in comparison.16 2 And as is often noted, and
often lamented, the United States has the highest per capita rate of incarceration in
the world.163 The nation's overall prison population increased steadily for most of

See Blum, The Crime and Punishmentof States, supra note 84; see also Luban,
158.
War as Punishment, supra note 48 (on soldiers as blameworthy); Ristroph, Respect and
Resistance in Punishment Theory, supra note 152 (on criminals as the equals of noncriminals

in some respects).
159.

Ristroph, Sentencing Reform, supra note 95, at 1308-13.

160.
See id. at 1310-13. The philosopher Julian Lamont makes a very similar point,
though he is speaking of distributive justice rather than retributive punishment:
When people make desert-claims they are not simply telling us what desert
itself requires. They unwittingly introduce external values, and make their
desert-judgments in light of those values. The reason why so many writers
have been able to affirm so confidently such a diverse and conflicting set
of desert-claims in debates over distributive justice is not because the true
conceptual and moral core of desert is so complex and difficult to discern.
It is because the true conceptual and moral core of desert allows the
introduction of external values and goals.
Julian Lamont, The Concept of Desert in DistributiveJustice, 44 PHIL. Q. 45, 49 (1994).
161.
See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 184 (1996) ("[D]esert often
serves as a proxy concept for fairness."); Markel, supra note 102, at 1445 (characterizing
desert as a "placeholder" for other principles).
162.
See generally DOUG HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION (2007). But see Darryl K.
Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization,86 TEx. L. REv. 223, 233 (2007) (acknowledging
that "[t]he growth in raw numbers of offenses on the books is undeniable," but arguing that
overcriminalization is a problem primarily of the federal criminal justice system, and showing
that state criminal justice systems have actually "contracted in important respects").
163.
See Roy WALMSLEY, INT'L CENTRE FOR PRISON STUDIES, WORLD
PRISON
POPULATION
LIST
1
(10th
ed.
2013),
available
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the last half-century, introducing the term "mass incarceration" to our vocabulary.164
Though the growth has now slowed or stopped, there is little chance of any
significant reduction in the rate of incarceration or in the overall prison population
in the near future. Strikingly, almost no one seems to want this vast criminal justice
system; political leaders and commentators across the ideological spectrum have
criticized both the reach of the substantive criminal law and the severity of American
sentencing policies. 165 There is support for the concept of a more rational,
disciplined criminal justice system, but few concrete ideas about how to get there.
One promising, previously uncharted, path would be a jus in poena:
principles to limit the violence of punishment that, like the jus in bello, are
independent of efforts to justify violence. This concluding Part sketches the details
of such an approach. To launch this discussion of what could be, and to see how far
we have to go, it is helpful first to observe just how deeply the project ofjustification
has structured ethical reflections on punishment, including efforts to identify and
implement ethical limitations on punishment. Limiting punishment is not, in those
basic terms, a new suggestion; scholars and commentators have often argued for
limiting principles for punishment. Nearly without exception, the proposed limiting
principles have been restatements of reasons to punish, accompanied by
admonitions to punish only when those reasons can be satisfied. The best-known
and most widely followed example of this approach is Norval Morris's call for
"desert as a limiting principle."1 6 6 Morris noted that intuitions concerning how much
punishment a given offender deserves are often imprecise, and suggested that the
concept of "just desert" was thus ill-suited to serve as a "defining principle,"
dictating the specific appropriate punishment. 167 Instead, desert should serve as a
limiting principle, "a principle that, though it would rarely tell us the exact sanction
to be imposed . .. would nevertheless give us the outer limits of leniency and
severity which should not be exceeded." 168 This suggestion has been widely
endorsed by scholars and practitioners alike, so much so that limiting retributivism
is characterized as the "consensus model" of criminal sentencing. 169 The idea is

at http://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/prisonstudies.org/files/resources/downloads/wppl_10.
pdf.
164.
The increase and its impact are the subject of several scholarly studies. See,
e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2010); MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS
OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2006); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND
INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF

IMPRISONMENT (1991).
165.
See Alice Ristroph, CriminalLaw in the Shadow of Violence, 62 ALA. L. REV.
571, 610-11 (2011) (elaborating further on this point).
166.
Norval Morris, Desert as a Limiting Principle, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING,
201 (Andrew Von Hirsch ed., 1992); see also Richard Frase, Limiting Retributivism, in THE
FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 83, 111-12 (Michael Tonry ed., 2004); Youngjae Lee, The
ConstitutionalRight Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 700-45 (2005).

167.

NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT

168.

Norval Morris, Punishment, Desert, and Rehabilitation, in SENTENCING 257,

259 (Hyman Gross & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 1981).

169.

Frase, supra note 166, at 84.

73 (1974).
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the offender's desert-tells

Limiting retributivism is not simply popular among theorists; practitioners
and law reformers have also endorsed it. Some commentators have suggested that it
is an implicit principle of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments. 7 0 In fact, the Supreme Court does sometimes seem to apply principles
of limiting retributivism-whether because of philosophers' persuasiveness, or just
by coincidence, it is difficult to say. The Court has frequently stated that a
punishment is cruel and unusual if it fails to serve any legitimate purpose of
punishment, and the recognized purposes of punishment are retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation-the four horsemen of justification so frequently
embraced by criminal law theorists.171 Champions of limiting retributivism have
found the concept vindicated, albeit incompletely, by Eighth Amendment decisions
limiting the imposition of the death penalty or life without parole ("LWOP")
sentences on the grounds that certain offenders do not deserve the sentences in

question.12
In the broad context of American punishment practices, though, limiting
retributivism has not limited much. The recent Eighth Amendment decisions in
capital and LWOP cases garner much attention and free nobody.' 7 3 These cases do

170.
See, e.g., Scott W. Howe, The Eighth Amendment as a Warrant Against
Undeserved Punishment, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 91 (2013); Lee, supra note 166.
171.
See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010) (noting that "[a] sentence
lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the
offense," and identifying retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation as "the
goals of penal sanctions that have been recognized as legitimate"). The Court, like some
commentators discussed in Part I.B, apparently equates "purpose" with "justification," so
that merely by showing (or even asserting) that punishment serves some purpose, we justify
it. A more rigorous approach to justification would require analysis not only of the purposes
punishment serves, but the costs it imposes. See supra Part I.B.
172.
See Graham, 560 U.S. at 71-72 (holding that retribution cannot justify life
without parole sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554
U.S. 407, 441-42 (2008) (holding that retribution cannot justify death sentence for the offense
of child rape); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-71 (2005) (holding that retribution
cannot justify the death penalty for juvenile offenders, given their diminished culpability);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-20 (2002) (holding that retribution cannot justify a
death sentence for a mentally retarded offender); see also Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison
Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the EighthAmendment: ProportionalityRelative to What?,
89 MINN. L. REv. 571, 592 (2005) ("[L]imiting retributivism appears to be the approach that
the Supreme Court has applied when it has invoked retributive principles."). It is a bit strange
to see these cases as a victory for retribution, in my view; in each case the Court concluded
that retribution could not justify the sentence in question. That, in itself, is not a retributive
decision; it is a recognition of the inadequacy of retributive claims. Cf Alice Ristroph,
Proportionalityas a Principle of Limited Government, 55 DuKE L.J. 263, 268-69 (2005)
[hereinafter Ristroph, Limited Government] (explaining that proportionality restrictions need
not be motivated by a particular account of punishment's justification, and indeed are often
motivated by political concerns independent of penological theory).
173.
When a given prisoner's death sentence is found to violate the Eighth
Amendment, the prisoner is eventually resentenced, usually to life in prison. See, e.g., State
ex. rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 413 (Mo. 2003) (finding that Eighth Amendment
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reduce sentences for a select few prisoners-a very select few, a tiny fraction of
those held in penal custody-but they do not necessarily even reduce the sentences
of the particular defendants who seemingly win in the Supreme Court. 7 4 Since the
vast majority of persons punished in the United States are sentenced to something
other than death or LWOP, the headline-grabbing Eighth Amendment decisions are
simply irrelevant to most American prisoners.' 7 5 For these prisoners, it is quite clear
from the numbers (of inmates in the United States, and of years to which these
inmates are sentenced) that limiting retributivism has not limited American penal
practices in any significant sense.176 I do not know whether retributivism has
actually contributed to the explosion in the prison population, as some commentators
have intimated. 177 Proponents of retributive and consequentialist punishment
theories have tended to blame each other for harsher sentencing policies, which may
only illustrate that neither type of theory dictates actual penal practices.178 In any
event, neither retributivism nor any other proposed limiting principle has actually
constrained American punishment.
To a student of the history and philosophy of war, the failure of justifying
principles to serve as limiting principles should not be surprising. Just as warring
states always make a case, usually in good faith, that they are justified in going to
war, punishing states always make a case, usually in good faith, that they are

bars imposition of death penalty on an offender who committed his crime at age 17, and
resentencing Christopher Simmons to life without parole). Similarly, when an LWOP
sentence is struck down, the prisoner may be resentenced to a term of years or even to another
life sentence so long as it includes the possibility of parole.
174.
For example, Daryl Atkins won a seeming victory before the Court in 2002,
when the Court found that the Eighth Amendment did not permit "mentally retarded"
offenders to be executed. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. But the Court left it to states to define
mental retardation and to decide whether individual defendants fell within that classification,
and in 2005, a Virginia jury found Daryl Atkins not mentally retarded and resentenced him
to death. See Maria Glod, Va. Killer Isn't Retarded,Jury Says; Execution Set; Case Prompted
Supreme Court Ruling; [Final Edition], WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2005, at A.0. Atkins's
sentence was later commuted to life in prison for independent reasons related to prosecutorial
misconduct.
175.
One scholar has estimated that Kennedy, Atkins, Roper, and Graham,
collectively, are likely to protect fewer than seven defendants per year-of the approximately
1.15 million offenders convicted of federal and state felonies each year. Stinneford, supra
note 124, at 901-03.
176.
See, e.g., E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
PRISONERS IN 2012: TRENDS IN ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES, 1991-2012, at 1 (rev. 2014);
JENIFER WARREN ET AL., PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA
2008, at 5, 19 (2008).
177.
See Nicola Lacey, Humanizing the Criminal Justice Machine: Re-Animated
Justice or Frankenstein'sMonster?, 126 HARV. L. REv. 1299, 1316 (2013) (book review)
(characterizing "retributivism, repackaged as 'just deserts"' as "the dominant public
philosophy of American punishment"); Edward Rubin, Just Say No to Retribution, 7 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REv. 17, 18 (2003).
178.
E.g., Francis A. Allen, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, in
SENTENCING 110, 114 (Hyman Gross & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 1981) (blaming
rehabilitative policies for lengthy sentences); Christopher, supra note 95 (blaming retributive
theories for long sentences).
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justified in imposing punishment.1' One difficulty with these claims of justification
is that they are usually impossible to disprove. They often rely on nonfalsifiable
moral judgments, or on predictive assertions that cannot be verified. The nonfalsifiability of a claim of justification would not necessarily thwart efforts to limit
punishment, were appellate courts more willing to exercise their own judgments in
opposition to legislatures or others who select severe punishments. As discussed in
Part I, however, courts tend to defer to other institutions on questions of how much
violence is appropriate. Only in the narrow contexts of capital punishment and
LWOP sentences has the Supreme Court rejected legislative determinations and
made an independent judgment about whether a given punishment is justified.'
Desert claims are particularly difficult to dislodge since, as noted above, the
ingredients of desert are poorly and inconsistently specified. But other purported
justifications of punishment are likely to fare no better as limiting principles.'
To be sure, other constraints on violence (such as the principles of the jus
in bello) also sometimes rely on moral judgments or predictive assertions, but
justificatory principles suffer an additional weakness that truly independent limiting
principles do not. Justifications of violence focus on the reasons to use violence.
They help overcome inhibitions against the use of violence; they can motivate the
agents of violence with self-righteous energy. They are a good way to convince
soldiers to risk their lives, or to convince legislators to devote more money to
prisons, or to convince the executioner that his is a noble calling. But justifications
of violence do not focus upon reasons not to use violence; they do not study the costs
of violence, or elaborate its harms, or call upon our humanitarian principles. Given
this structure of justificatory arguments, they should not be expected to serve well
as devices to limit violence.
So let us imagine a different approach to limiting punishment: a jus in
poena. Like the jus in bello and international humanitarian law, this effort to limit
violence would remain independent of any claim about the justification of that
violence. This project would radically reorient criminal law theory, since, as noted
above, theorists presently tend to view the justification of punishment as the primary
question of criminal law theory and as a question that determines the appropriate
approach to almost all other questions in the field. A jus in poena would transform
legal doctrine, too, sometimes by suggesting new legal rules and sometimes by
providing a better foundation for existing principles. The development of a jus in
poena is a project too large for one article-or indeed, for one scholar or one
lifetime-but in the remainder of this Part, I will elaborate some of the possible
components of this approach. I begin with relatively modest implications and
proceed to more radical ones.

179.
See, e.g., cases cited supranote 173.
180.
Compare Graham v. Florida., 560 U.S. 48 (2010), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002), with Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
181.
See Ristroph, Sentencing Reform, supra note 95, at 1350-51 (arguing that all
standard justifications of punishment are poor strategies for limiting punishment, because
"theories quickly become translated into broad, vague rhetoric that is invoked to justify more
or less anything").
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Categorical rules are one of the most reliable ways to restrict behavior since
they leave little room for discretion and interpretation. The categorical rules of the
jus in bello, such as absolute bans on certain types of weapons, are among its greatest
successes. 8 2 A jus in poena could provide a much stronger intellectual defense of
certain categorical rules in criminal justice. For example, there is fairly widespread
support for the principle that we should not punish people who are actually innocent,
but the rationale for that principle is sometimes mysterious. One common
explanation for the rule unsurprisingly focuses on retribution and just deserts:
according to this view, we should not punish the innocent because they do not
deserve to be punished.'8 3 A problem with this view, one that has arisen in many
wrongful convictions cases, is that desert is an elastic and ill-specified concept, and
quite often prosecutors and others resisting a wrongful-conviction claim seem to be
motivated by a view that this defendant, whether or not he is guilty of this particular
crime, is a bad person who deserves to be in jail. 184 Additionally, to link a rule
against punishing the innocent to retribution renders the rule vulnerable once we
recognize that retribution is surely not the only social goal we pursue. For example,
some scholars have pushed back against the wrongful-convictions movement and
suggested that if we think of the overall aims of punishment-the justifications of
the system as a whole-some wrongful convictions might just be a necessary price
for an effective crime-control system.'
A better way to understand the ban on punishing the innocent is to compare
it to the jus in bello prohibition of intentional attacks on civilians. The prohibition
of attacks on civilians has nothing to do with their desert. We may indeed believe
today that civilians do not deserve to be attacked, but this was not always the
predominant way of thinking about war.' 8 6 Rather, it is a humanitarian principle that
seeks to contain the destructiveness of war. Similarly, the prohibition on punishing
the innocent should be framed as a humanitarian principle motivated by the
recognition that punishment is harmful and needs to be contained. According to this
view, it is no longer necessary to argue about whether a factually guilty but legally
innocent defendant deserves punishment, or whether punishing some innocent
scapegoats could function as an effective deterrent. Instead, we simply recognize
that punishment, like war, is a kind of violence that we must contain with certain

182.
Michael N. Schmitt, Bellum Americanum: The U.S. View of Twenty-first
Century War and Its Possible Implicationsfor the Law ofArmed Conflict, 19 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 1051, 1084 (1998) (discussing "a clear trend in the direction of prohibiting weapons on the
basis of humanity, most recently evidenced by the Chemical Weapons, Biological Weapons,
Conventional Weapons, and Anti-Personnel Mines Conventions") (footnotes omitted).
183.
Indeed, theorists frequently assert that one of retributivism's advantages over
consequentialism is that the latter will sometimes allow punishment of the innocent. See
Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functionsof Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 18 n.11 (2006)
("The accusation that utilitarians must be prepared, if true to their principles, to punish
innocent but apparently guilty people is a classic retributivist objection to utilitarianism.").
184.
See DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA'S RACE TO
CONVICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT 127-35 (2012) (discussing prosecutorial
resistance to exoneration efforts even in the face of strong exculpatory evidence).
185.
See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH.
L. REV. 65, 79-80 (2008).
186.
See Luban, War as Punishment,supra note 48, at 313.
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bright-line rules. Just as there are sensible reasons to draw a bright line between
soldiers and civilians-even though some civilians may be "blameworthy," and
some soldiers may not be-there are sensible reasons to draw a bright line between
those adjudicated guilty and those who are not.' 8 7
Or consider categorical bans on certain types of punishment. To the extent
that current law recognizes some narrow categorical bans-the Eighth Amendment
prohibitions of capital punishment for some offenders and some offenses, and its
restrictions on LWOP sentences for juveniles-it does so on the unstable proposition
that the given penalty is never justified in those specific circumstances. But to almost
half the Supreme Court, and a sizable portion of the population at large, those claims
of justification or nonjustification are simply wrong. According to these critics,
retribution (or another punishment theory) could justify, and may even demand, the
punishments in question. 18 In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court decision
banning capital punishment for juvenile offenders, the dispute between the five
Justices in the majority and the four Justices in the minority is not one easily settled
by argument or evidence. It turns on a fundamentally subjective conclusion about
what is deserved-a conclusion subject to all the imprecision and manipulability
inherent in the concept of desert. Moreover, the existing rationale for these
categorical Eighth-Amendment rules sits uneasily with a core principle of
sentencing doctrine: commitment to individualized sentencing. 189 Individualized
sentencing requires a particularized judgment of the appropriate penalty in each
case. To retributivists, individualized sentencing reflects the premise that desert
must be assessed on a case-by-case basis; one cannot assess what is "deserved" for
entire classes of offenders at once. The prohibition of the death penalty for all
juvenile offenders, or all nonhomicide offenders, seems to be the very kind of
categorical desert assessment that individualized sentencing seeks to avoid.
Existing categorical bans, as well as the long-term eradication of other
severe penal practices, would be better secured without relying on arguments about
the justification of punishment. Again, the argument would be a humanitarian claim
about the limitation of violence, much like the humanitarian bans on the use of
certain types of weapons in the laws of war. This humanitarian approach to
punishment need not be grounded in the Eighth Amendment, but it is a logical
interpretation of that constitutional provision. The Amendment, by its terms, bans
cruelty. That prohibition is a fundamentally humanitarian principle, as reflected by

187.
See Ristroph, Respect and Resistance, supra note 152, at 612 (discussing
Thomas Hobbes's nonretributive arguments for limiting punishment to those adjudicated
guilty).
188.
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 600-01 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that retribution and deterrence could justify the death penalty for some
juvenile offenders, including the particular defendant whose case was before the Court); id.
at 621 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court's contention that the goals of retribution and
deterrence are not served by executing murderers under 18 is ... transparently false.").
189.
Individualized sentencing is constitutionally required in capital cases. See
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976). It is not an absolute constitutional
requirement outside of the death-penalty context, but the Court has suggested individualized
sentencing is the preferred approach. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 26465 (2005).
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the Supreme Court's occasional citations to humanitarian and human rights
judgments from around the world in its decisions interpreting the Eighth
Amendment.' 9 0 To impose capital punishment on minors is cruel, and we do not
mitigate the cruelty by keeping the minor in prison until he comes of age and then
perform the execution. To impose capital punishment on someone with severe
mental impairments is cruel, and it is cruel no matter how terrible the crimes
committed by the impaired defendant. Though American courts have not yet
recognized it, to keep a prisoner in prolonged solitary confinement may also be
cruel, and a categorical ban on this practice is best grounded on humanitarian
principles rather than claims of (non)justification.191
Importantly, the bans in international humanitarian law on certain types of
weapons-or on torture, or cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment, for that
matter-reflect judgments not only about the human dignity of the targets of
violence, but also the human dignity of the agents of violence. It is inhumane to
inflict certain types of violence, no matter how reprehensible the actions of the target
of the violence may be. The recent U.S. experiment with "coercive interrogation
techniques" should illustrate clearly that a prohibition on torture or other violence is
inherently unstable if it is contingent on judgments about the targets of violence, or
indeed on judgments about the efficacy of the violence.' 92 Those who would justify
extreme violence will inevitably find targets deserving enough, or necessities
pressing enough. Experience has shown that it is far more effective to ground
categorical prohibitions of violence on humanitarian arguments about what the
violence does to all of us-targets, agents, observers, and even the alleged
beneficiaries of it.
I suspect, also, that if American criminal law is ever to implement an
effective proportionality restriction on prison sentences, whether through the Eighth
Amendment or through other channels, such a proportionality rule will not rest on
claims of justification. The proportionality rule we have now is essentially an
exhortation to punish only as much as is justified, and as noted above, it is almost
completely ineffective. Like states going to war, states imposing punishment always
claim (likely in good faith) that they are justified. To devise a new approach to
proportionality, one might look to the jus in bello principle of proportionality, which
is not dependent on claims of justification for military force. Rather, it provides that
a given military strike is prohibited if it is likely to cause harm to civilians
disproportionate to the claimed military necessity.'9' Now, this particular principle

190.
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-76 (noting that the Court has long "referred to the
laws of other countries and to international authorities as instructive for its interpretation of
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of 'cruel and unusual punishments"' and citing
examples).
191.
See generally Lobel, supra note 119.
192.
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
193.
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions prohibits indiscriminate
attacks, including any attack "which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." Protocol
Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 51(5)(b); see also id. at 57(2)(a)(iii).

1060

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 56:4

of the laws of war is not easily or directly translated to the punishment context,
because it is focused on harms to third parties-civilians-and not on harms to the
direct targets of violence-the foreign military. A proportionality restriction on
punishment must consider the harm to the offender (though perhaps it should also
consider the indirect harms to third parties, as elaborated below). Still, consideration
of the jus in bello principle of proportionality is helpful insofar as it illustrates that
proportionality limitations need not be based on claims of justification. Elsewhere,
I have elaborated on a theory of penal proportionality that offers courts a way to
limit the severity of punishment without adopting one or more penological

theories.' 94
An additional implication of a jus in poena for both doctrine and
philosophy concerns the interpretation of the word "punishment." Current
constitutional doctrine evaluates whether a given state action is punishment by
applying a multifactor test that focuses heavily on the state's purposes.' 95 Notably,
mainstream punishment theory tends also to define punishment largely in terms of
intent, and often, in terms that build the normative justification of punishment into
the definition of the word.1 96 These approaches give states considerable leeway to
avoid constitutional restrictions on punishment by arguing that a given instance of
violence was not intended as punishment.' 97 Here again, the history, philosophy, and
laws of war provide helpful comparisons. At one time, the question whether a state
was at war, and thus subject to the laws of war, was largely determined by the state

194.
Ristroph, Limited Government, supra note 172, at 317-27.
195.
To distinguish between a civil sanction and criminal punishment, "we must
initially ascertain whether the legislature meant to establish 'civil' proceedings. If so, we
ordinarily defer to the legislature's stated intent." Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361
(1997). The Court "will reject the legislature's manifest intent only where a party challenging
the statute provides 'the clearest proof' that 'the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in
purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention' to deem it 'civil."' Id. In evaluating a
claim that a state action is punishment notwithstanding the state's formal classification, the
Court considers several factors. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69
(1963) ("Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has
historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution
and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether
it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the
inquiry [of whether a given action constitutes] punishment").
196.
See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text. If normative definitions of
punishment are adopted as a matter of legal doctrine, there are important consequences for
the regulation of punitive violence. When courts define punishment in normative terms, the
constitutional provisions that regulate "punishment" seem to become inapplicable to acts of
violence that do not satisfy the prescribed normative constraints. Perversely, the worst abuses
are the ones least restricted by constitutional doctrine. See Alice Ristroph, Sexual
Punishments, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 139, 163-66 (2006) (discussing Justice Thomas's
proposed definition of punishment and its implications, including its exclusion of assaults in
prison from constitutional regulation).
197.
See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368-69 (1997) (finding
indefinite commitment of sexual offenders not to constitute punishment, noting among other
factors that "the State has disavowed any punitive intent").
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itself and its choice whether to make a formal declaration of war. A key development
of the jus in bello was a shift toward a definition of "armed conflict" in positive,
objective terms that could be assessed by third-party observers.' 9 8 A more objective
definition of punishment that relied less on the state's purpose would be more
difficult to manipulate. State practices that, to date, have been construed as
nonpunitive, such as the indefinite detention of sex offenders, might then be brought
within the purview of the Constitution's regulations of punishment. 99
There are good reasons for a doctrinal definition of punishment that focuses
more on substantive, objective factors rather than state intentions. It is not doctrine
alone, however, that could benefit from a reconceptualization of what counts as
punishment. Philosophies of punishment have become increasingly divorced from
real penal practices, and this disconnect is partly due to the tendency of philosophers
to build normative justifications into the very definition of punishment. If we define
punishment narrowly, then some of the terrible things that actually occur in prisons
are clearly not part of "punishment," and so a justification of punishment need not
address them. For example, physical assaults between prisoners do not fall within
most philosophers' definitions of punishment; under such an approach, a high
incidence of prisoner-on-prisoner attacks may be regrettable but it does not impact
the justification of punishment. 200 Punishment theorists have thus excused
themselves from addressing the full dimensions of the practices and experiences that
are commonly known outside the academy as punishment. 2 0 ' A more interesting and
honest approach to punishment theory-and one more likely to be relevant to realworld policy and practice-would define punishment objectively, and only then
tackle the difficult normative evaluations of various dimensions of punishment.
Ultimately, a jus in poena could force both philosophers and lawyers to
grapple with issues such as prisoner-on-prisoner assaults even if those assaults are
not classified as punishment. One of the most radical implications of a jus in poena
would be the principle, drawn from the jus in bello, that collateral damage matters
to ethical and legal assessments. As discussed in Part II, facts about the actual impact
198.
See Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Choice of Law Against Terrorism, 4 J. NAT'L
L. & POL'Y 343, 354-55 (2010).
199.
See Ristroph, Sexual Punishments,supra note 196, at 167-70 (articulating an
objective approach to the definition of punishment). Not surprisingly, critics of penal
practices are more likely to define punishment with reference to substantive, non-intent-based
factors. See, e.g., TED HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS REVISITED
15 (1969); NIGEL WALKER, WHY PUNISH? THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT REASSESSED 1-3 (1991).
200.
See, e.g., Gray,supra note 12, at 1653; Dan Markel & Chad Flanders, Bentham
on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to Retributive Justice, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 907,
968 (2010). A related weakness of punishment theory is its tendency to frame the question of
justification as a question of individual punishments for individual offenders. Systemic
outputs, such as the pronounced race and class disparities among U.S. prisoners, are treated
as irrelevant to the justification of punishment. See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 12, at 311
("[V]iewed in isolation, the race and class position of America's inmate population tells us
nothing regarding the legitimacy of the sentences being served."). Dolovich is troubled by the
racial and socioeconomic disparities, but she views them as demonstrating the need to justify
punishment-not calling into question whether American punishment can be justified.
201.
See Adam Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, 18 LEGAL THEORY 1 (2012)
(noting and criticizing this phenomenon).
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of a war are centrally important to the ethical evaluation of the war. If the ethics of
criminal justice were inspired by the ethics of war, we might adopt the view that
collateral damage matters to the ethical analysis of the criminal justice system. The
collateral damage of the war on crime is immense. Consider the impact on the
families of prisoners; consider the broader social impact on communities when one
in three black men, or even higher rates in some areas, will serve time in prison at
some point in his life. 20 2 Consider the conditions within prisons; consider so-called
collateral consequences, or the restrictions on job opportunities, education, and
social services for those who exit prison. All of this may be collateral to the
imposition of punishment. But what comes of the label "collateral"? In war,
collateral damage is not prohibited-it is hard to see how it could be-nor is it
merely regretted with shrugged shoulders. Collateral damage may be labeled as
collateral, but it is ethically central. The proportionality requirement of the jus in
bello holds that an attack is impermissible if it will cause collateral damage
disproportionate to the expected military advantage. The fact that a given military
strategy triggers secondary consequences is relevant to the ethical evaluation of the
strategy. As we saw in Part II, in general philosophies of war have been engaged
with facts, and responsive to facts, in ways that philosophies of punishment have
not. War is too real and too painful for the abstractions of ideal theory. So too, I
suggest, is punishment. In criminal justice, we are overdue for an analysis of the
collateral damage wreaked by our current policies.
A final implication of a jus in poena is worth noting, though I cannot
explore its full scope here. If the ethics of criminal justice were inspired by the ethics
of war, we would have to confront head-on the difficulty of regulating the state and
holding it responsible. We could not justify punishment in the passive voice,
speaking of criminals who deserve to be punished by an invisible agent. Instead
criminal law theorists would have to tackle a host of difficult questions about the
individual and institutional actors that are the agents of punishment. We would have
to consider ways to hold these actors responsible for excessive punishment, of
course, but we would also have to contemplate state responsibility for the
consequences of even legitimate punishment. As part of this project of regulating
the state, punishment theorists and punishing judges would have to move past their
reluctance to second-guess the experts who use force, or who make decisions about
its use. It has been said that war is too important to be left to the generals. Similarly,
the use of force on our own turf, against our own citizens, is too important to be left
to the specialists who make a profession out of criminal justice.

CONCLUSION
It is important not to overstate the successes of efforts to discipline, and
limit, warfare. The War on Terror has tested the principles-and exposed
weaknesses-in the jus in bello. By some cynical accounts, the jus in bello, or
international humanitarian law, is something that strong nations enforce against
weak ones. When a relatively strong nation like the United States sees international
humanitarian law as an obstacle to its own use of violence, international
202.
See SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMITTEE REGARDING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE UNITED STATES CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 1, 12-13 (2013).
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humanitarian law is fast discarded, nothing more than rubble to be cleared aside.203
On this view, the Athenian generals were right: the strong do what they can and the
weak suffer what they must.
I am not quite that cynical, but I do acknowledge that the jus in bello has
not yet achieved nearly as much as it hopes. The limits on warfare are still far weaker
than any humanitarian would hope. The jus in bello is still a work in progress-but
it is progress. It is a noble and sometimes successful effort to constrain violence.
Our criminal justice system needs the same. Most importantly, we need to
acknowledge the difference between justifying violence and limiting it, and shift our
efforts to the latter project.

203.
See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbl, Guantanamo,Rasul, and the Twilight of Law, 53
L. REv. 897, 909-10 (2005).
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